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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, U.S. Congress’s enactment of a comprehensive health care
reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,1 along with the Health
Care & Education Affordability Reconciliation Bill of 20102 (collectively referred to
herein as the “Health Care Reform Act”), adopted the “individual mandate,” a
requirement that every American possess a certain level of health insurance3 through
which universal access to health care can be achieved.4 The individual mandate no
doubt is the most important yet most controversial linchpin of the U.S. Health Care
Reform Act. The mandate drew scrutiny regarding its constitutionality because a
direct and unconditional requirement for an individual to transfer money to one or
more health insurance programs5 for health or economic purposes seems to violate
1

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The
Act was passed by the House of Representative on March 21, 2010 and signed into law by
President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANTICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/1673534/Patient-Protection-and-Affordable-Care-Act-PPACA/295483/Finalpassage (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
2
Health Care & Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. § 20 and U.S.C. § 42).
3

The individual mandate is essential to the effectiveness of the U.S. Health Care Reform
because lack of health insurance in the American health care system was the main problem to
be rectified in the pre-March 2010 insurance system. Karen Tumulty, Kate Pickert & Alice
Park, America, The Doctor Will See You Now, TIME, Apr. 5, 2010, at 18, 20. According to
information provided, 32 million Americans were uninsured in March 2010. Jill Jackson and
John Nolen, Health Care Reform Bill Summary: A Look at What's in the Bill, CBS (last
updated Mar. 23, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20000846503544.html. In 2008, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also
estimated that there were about 43.8 million Americans (14.7% of total population) uninsured,
of which 15.25% were under age 18 (6.6 million) and over 65 years old (0.2 million). HEALTH
INSURANCE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/fastats/hinsure.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2012).
4

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
Section 5000A(a) states: “Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage. An
applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and
any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum
essential coverage for such month.”
5
There are two main types of universal health care systems. One is the single-payer
coverage system, such as the English National Health Service, the Canadian Health Care
System, and Taiwan’s National Health Insurance, in which health care would be financed
through taxation, thereby eliminating private insurance companies (because private health
insurance is prohibited except to finance items not covered by the governmental plans). Adam
Oliver, The Single-Payer Option: A Reconsideration, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 509, 527
(2009). The second system is the multiple-payer system, such as French National Health
Insurance and the German health insurance system, which contains competitive health

2013]

CAN COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE BE JUSTIFIED?

53

individual liberties (or individual autonomy),6 especially the “disenrollment
freedom” (the freedom to refuse to enroll in a health care program).7 Still today,
there is much disagreement about whether the individual mandate could be
considered justified as “regulating” individual liberties.
Therefore, a systematic examination of Taiwan’s health care reform, which is a
single-payer system based upon regulated competition but has a compulsory scheme
that contains a mandate, might interest U.S. policymakers and scholars who either
support or oppose universal coverage. First, similar to the new U.S. Health Care
Reform Act,8 Taiwan’s National Health Insurance (NHI) also requires all citizens to
insurers under clear and strong federal guidelines. PETER ZWEIFEL, DISCUSSION PAPER:
MULTIPLE PAYERS IN HEALTH CARE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT, HEALTH NUTRITION
AND POPULATION FAMILY, HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT NETWORK, WORLD BANK 1
(2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONAND
POPULATION/Resources/2816271095698140167/ZweifelMultiPayersinHealthCareFinal.pdf
. Generally speaking, the single-payer system generates far less administrative costs than the
multiple-payer system, but the former also takes away the patient's choice of provider. See
infra Section VI. On the contrary, the multiple-payer system may have an advantage in
designing payment systems in a way that reinforces incentives for providers to do the right
thing for their patients, resulting in more value for money spent. Aftab Hussain & Patrick A.
Rivers, Policy Challenges in US Health Care System Reform, 36(3) J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 34,
41 (2010).
6

Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 40, 40 (2009).
7
“Disenrollment freedom” means recipients can freely decide to disenroll in a health care
plan while their health care needs are few, and to enroll when their health care needs escalate.
Disenrollment, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Disenrollment (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
8

According to sections 1501(b), 1513, and 1511 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding sections 5000A
(maintenance of minimum essential coverage) and 4980H (shared responsibility for employers
regarding health coverage), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is amended by adding
section 18A (automatic enrollment for employers of large employers). Amended section
5000A of the Internal Revenue Code first states that, in 2014, individuals will be required to
purchase health insurance or face a $95 annual fine (via income taxes), which will increase to
$350 in 2015 and $750 in 2016. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). There are only a few exceptions. §
5000A(d)(2) (for religious objectors); § 5000A(e)(1) (for those who cannot afford health
insurance); § 5000A(e)(2) (taxpayers with incomes less than 100% of the Federal Poverty
Line (FPL)); § 5000A(e)(3) (American Indian tribe members); § 5000A(k) (those with a
hardship waiver); § 5000A(d)(3) (individuals not lawfully present); § 5000A(d)(4)
(incarcerated individuals); § 5000A(e)(4) (those not covered for less than three months). For
those under age 18, most of which are dependents of other taxpayers, the amount of the
penalty for not having health insurance will be one-half the amount for adults and should be
paid by such other taxpayers. § 5000A(c)(3)(C); § 5000A(b)(3)(A). For those with incomes at
or below 133% of the FPL, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act also creates a new
mandatory Medicaid eligibility category and requires the federal government to devote more
resources and assistance. §1331. In addition, according to amended section 4980H of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, employers with more than 50 employees (large employers)
are required to offer fulltime employees (and their dependents) the “opportunity” to enroll in
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan. 26 U.S.C. §
4980H(d)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2012). Failing doing so, employers would face a payment of
$750 per full-time employee. § 4980H(a). Amended section 218a of the Fair Labor Standards
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subscribe to health insurance.9 Basically, all residents are required to subscribe to the
public mandatory health insurance10 or are subject to a fine of no less than NT$3,000
(about US $94.25) and no more than NT$15,000 (about US $471.25).11 Second,
similarly to the U.S., Taiwan also faced intense debate about the constitutionality
and morality of the individual mandate when the NHI was launched in 1995.12
No doubt, Taiwan’s NHI system seems to satisfy most citizens’ needs because
the participation rate (otherwise known as the enrollment rate or coverage rate) is
high,13 and public satisfaction with the NHI has always been high since its inception

Act of 1938 further states that employers with 200 or more full-time employees are required to
“automatically” enroll new full-time employees in employer-sponsored health insurance
plans. 29 U.S.C. § 218a (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, the individual mandate under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act basically requires all Americans to purchase
health insurance if it is not provided by their employer, and if they are self-employed, they
must buy it as well, regardless of whether a citizen needs it, wants it, or can afford it.
9
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, all citizens are also required to
maintain “minimum essential coverage” and to subscribe to health insurance. See Bruce
Moyer, Unconstitutional Health Care Reform?, 57-FEB FED. LAW. 8, 8 (2010). The
difference is, Taiwan citizens must subscribe only to the NHI (which provides comprehensive
health care coverage) while citizens in the U.S. can choose different health care programs. See
infra section I.
10

Chapter II, Article 11-1 of the National Health Insurance Act (Taiwan): “Except for the
circumstances prescribed in Article 11, all the beneficiaries qualified under Article 10 shall
subscribe to this Insurance.” National Health Insurance Act ch. II, art. 11-1 (Taiwan) (1994),
available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id
=295&WD_ID=295&webdata_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). The following persons are
not covered by this Insurance and shall be withdrawn from it if they have subscribed: (1) those
who are confined in the detention centers or in prisons because of criminal punishment,
rehabilitative disciplines, or reformatory education, unless their terms are less than two
months. (2) those who are subject to a protective restriction order, however, are still covered
by this Insurance; (3) those who have been missing for six months or more; (4) those who
have lost the qualifications as prescribed in the preceding Article.” National Health Insurance
Act. ch. II, art. 11.
11
Chapter 2, Article 69-1 of the National Health Insurance Act (Taiwan): “If a beneficiary
who, in violation of the provisions of this Act, has not subscribed to this Insurance, he/she
shall be subject to a fine of no less than three thousand and no more than fifteen thousand
New Taiwan Dollars and shall subscribe to this Insurance retrospectively from the date on
which the beneficiary is qualified for insurance. The benefits shall be suspended before the
fines and premium are fully paid.” National Health Insurance Act ch. II, art. 69-1.
12

Tsung-Mei Cheng, A Brief History of Taiwan's Individual Mandate, GLOBAL PUBLIC
SQUARE BLOG, (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012
/03/28/how-taiwan-learned-to-love-the-individual-mandate/.
13

The following figure shows the relationship between coverage rate of the NHI and per
capita GNP in Taiwan. This figure also shows that the coverage rate rose sharply after the
implementation of the NHI in 1995. T. L. Chiang, Dean of School of Public Health, Nat’l
Taiwan U., Address at The National Taiwan University Center for Ethics, Law, and Society in
Biomedicine and Technology 2010 Bioethics Conference: Ethical Issues in Public Health and
Resource Allocation, Health Care Reforms in Taiwan: What Worked and What Didn’t? (Oct.
9, 2010) (transcript available in the Center for Ethics‚ Law and Society in Biomedicine and
Technology, National Taiwan University).
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in 1995.14 In addition, the system also has one of the lowest administrative costs in
the world15 and still maintains a relatively high perception of quality16 by using
proper regulations and monitoring mechanisms.17 However, Taiwan’s Grand Justices
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“The NHI system faced considerable challenges and resistance when it was first put in
place, and public satisfaction with the program at its inception stood at below 40%. Today,
nearly 80% of local residents are satisfied with the system, a reflection of the public's
recognition of the Bureau's efforts over the past 15 years. Although the system's satisfaction
rating plummeted in 2002 when premiums and copayments were raised, it quickly recovered
to 77% a year later and has remained near 80% the past two years.” BUREAU OF NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN TAIWAN: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 41
(2011), available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/Resource/webdata/13767_1_NHI%20IN%20
TAIWAN%202011%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.pdf.
15

The NHI’s administrative burden was 2.2 % of the program’s budget in 2001, although
Chapter 7, Article 68 of the NHI allows the BNHI to spend as much as 3.5% of its annual
budget for administration. National Health Insurance Act. ch. VII, art. 68 (1994) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu
_id=295&WD_ID=295&webdata_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). In 2008, the NHI’s
administrative burden further decreased to 1.51%. Tsung-Mei Cheng, Taiwan’s New National
Health Insurance Program: Genesis and Experience So Far, 22(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 64
(2003).
16

See, e.g., Li Chuang, The Effect of Cost Containment and Quality After the National
Health Insurance System In Taiwan (June 30, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, National
Central University) (on file with the National Central University Library Electronic Theses &
Dissertation System) (Taiwan).
17
For example, to both control medical expenditures and respect physician’s professional
autonomy, the BNHI developed the “hospital excellence program,” which places individual
hospital budgeting (or spending), rather than hospital budgeting, in the center of control of
medication costs for each hospital. See, e.g., Lih-Wen Mau, Effect Assessments of the
Hospital Excellent Program on Hospital Finance and Medical Care Quality from the
Perspective of Game Theory—Based on Regional Hospitals and Medical Centers in
Kaohsiung-Pingtung Areas (June 30, 2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, Kaohsiung Medical
University) (on file with the National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan)
(Taiwan); YUNG-I HO, HOSPITAL’S ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVES—AN EXAMPLE OF THE
“GLOBAL BUDGET SYSTEM” AND “HOSPITAL EXCELLENCE PROGRAM” (June 30, 2007) (master
thesis, Hsuan Chuang University) (on file with the National Digital Library of Theses and
Dissertations in Taiwan) (Taiwan); Meng-Shiun Li, A Study on the Relationship between the
Quality of Care and the Performance of Health Care Organizations among Hospitals in Taipei
Medical Region under the National Health Insurance System (June 30, 1998) (unpublished
master thesis, National Taiwan University) (on file with the National Digital Library of
Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan) (Taiwan). In addition, the BNHI has tried to build a
nationwide dataset of quality indicators and foster excellence in hospitals with guidance from
these quality indicator outcomes. See, e.g., Lih-Wen Mau, Effect Assessments of the Hospital
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Council (the Constitutional Court) expressed concerns about the constitutionality of
compulsory national health insurance because the individual mandate would
significantly deprive individuals from freely allocating their resources and from
choosing their own insurance.18 Therefore, even though the Court agreed that
compulsory subscription of health insurance conforms to the constitutional purposes
of “improving national health”19 and “promoting national health insurance,”20 it
nonetheless required authorities to “conduct at [the] appropriate time [a] full-range
evaluation and implement improvement measures in aspects of the insurance
operations [i.e., regulated competition,] including diversification of the insurers.”21
In other words, the Court implied that the individual mandate might be
constitutionally justified,22 while the individual mandate for regulated competition
might not be justified.23
In the U.S., individual liberty is also central to the health care reform debate and
has generated constitutional challenges.24 Constitutional challenges to the individual
mandate came also from other perspectives, such as limits on federalism,25 taxation
and spending powers,26 religious objections,27 due process,28 and under the

Excellent Program on Hospital Finance and Medical Care Quality from the Perspective of
Game Theory—Based on Regional Hospitals and Medical Centers in Kaohsiung-Pingtung
Areas (June 30, 2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, Kaohsiung Medical University) (on file with the
National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan) (Taiwan).
18
In other words, when the Health Care Act requires individuals to buy health insurance,
it also prevents individuals from spending their own resources to buy goods other than health
insurance. Healthcare in Taiwan, TAIWAN HEALTHCARE REFORM FOUNDATION, http://www.
thrf.org.tw/EN/Page_Show.asp?Page_ID=124 (last visted Oct. 4, 2012).
19

Article 157 of the Taiwanese Constitution: “The State, in order to improve national
health, shall establish extensive services for sanitation and health protection, and a system of
public medical service.” MINGUO XIANFA art. 157, (1947) (Taiwan).
20

Article 10, Paragraph 5 of the Taiwan Constitution, “The State shall promote universal
health insurance and promote the research and development of both modern and traditional
medicines.” MINGUO XIANFA art. 10(5), (1947) (Taiwan).
21

Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (January 29, 1999) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
22

It is worth noting that John B. Crosby and David L. Heidorn also agree that the
individual mandate for health insurance might survive the political process. John B. Crosby &
David L. Heidorn, Achieving Full Access: It's Already Being Done, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
31, 33 (1993).
23
Chuan-Feng Wu & Wen-Hong Huang, A Study of the Problem with Article 11-1
(Mandatory Insurance) in National Health Insurance Law – from the Aspect of the Rights to
Health Care, 77 TAIWAN L. REV. 112, 115-16 (2001).
24
See, e.g., John B. Crosby & David L. Heidorn, supra note 22; Mark A. Peterson, From
Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 1145, 1154 (2003).
25
26

See Moyer, supra note 9.

For example, David S. Caroline argues that the solution to health care problems in the
U.S. is to explore other market-based mechanisms for providing health care rather than
mandating individuals to buy health insurance. David S. Caroline, Employer Health-Care
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Commerce Clause.29 Scholars across political and philosophical spectrums propose
different theories to defy or to defend the individual mandate.30 Further, a segment of
American society still believes that the individual mandate threatens the very fabric
of America's cherished liberties31 and is “liberty-crushing” by invading the area of
individual autonomy.32 Thus, a growing list of states filed legal challenges to the
U.S. Health Care Reform Act33 based on the constitutional legitimacy of the
Mandates: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Question, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 427, 445-46
(2009).
27

For example, based upon the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Mark A. Hall
argued that “one potential basis for an individual-rights challenge to compulsory health
insurance is a religious objection under the First Amendment's Exercise of Free Speech
Clause.” See Hall, supra note 6, at 45.
28
Mark A. Hall argued that the individual mandate might be unconstitutional because
requiring individuals to spend money to buy health insurance they do not want to spend could
be viewed as a deprivation of property or liberty, “which the Fifth Amendment allows only
with ‘due process.’” See Hall, supra note 6, at 45.
29

For example, after examining the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, David Rivkin and Lee Casey conclude that the individual mandate is
unconstitutional and likely to be struck down by courts. According to Rivkin and Casey, the
individual mandate would give the government “the power to direct the use of people's
resources, combined with the fact that the government's taxing and spending powers already
transfer a large amount of resources away from the private sector and into public channels,
would turn everybody into a ward of the state, unable to exercise individual choices.” David
B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Jack M. Balkin, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of
An Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 101-118 (2009).
30

Wendy E. Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 401, 401-413 (2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/j.1748-720X.2011.00610.x/pdf.
31
For example, in 1917 The New York Times argued that the American way of life
(individualism) was threatened by the compulsory health insurance scheme, which represents
“German collectivism.” BEATRIX HOFFMAN, THE WAGES OF SICKNESS 55 (2001).
32
See, e.g., Karl Manheim & Jamie Court, Not So Fast On The Mandates: Clinton's and
Obama's Health Proposals May Not Pass Constitutional Muster, LOS ANGELES TIMES, March
24, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/24/opinion/oe-court24; David B. Rivkin Jr. &
Lee A. Casey, Mandatory Insurance Is Unconstitutional: Why An Individual Mandate Could
Be Struck Down by the Courts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1
0001424052970204518504574416623109362480.html; Katharine Q. Seelye, A Constitutional
Debate Over a Health Care Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, September 26, 2009, http://prescriptions.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/the-right-the-duty-to-bear-insurance-cards; Andrew Jensen,
Alaska Joins 19 States Suing Federal Government Over Health Insurance Reform, ALASKA
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (last updated April 20, 2010 5:50 PM), http://www.homernews.com/
stories/042010/news_ajq.shtml.
33

As of April 14, 2010, eighteen states, including Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington, sued the federal
government concerning the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act. They assert that the lawsuit aims “to prevent the unprecedented expansion of federal
powers, impact upon state sovereignty and encroachment on our freedom.” Georgia Joins
Health Care Reform Lawsuit, SOUTH FLORIDA BUSINESS JOURNAL (April 13, 2010), http://
southflorida.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2010/04/12/daily24.html.
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individual mandate.34 On the other hand, justifications for the individual mandate
have also been explored.35 For example, Edward Lee argues that universal access to
health care requires more than just the market-based distribution of health
insurance,36 and that one essential component of universal access is requiring each
citizen to enroll in the same or similar health insurance program.37 Jack Balkin
argues that if the tax system is constitutional, the individual mandate should be as
well, because both act as incentives to engage citizens in socially desirable behavior
(e.g., to purchase health insurance) and to reduce the costs of government
programs.38 On fairness grounds, Norman Daniels39 agrees that “mandatory coverage
and participation” should be the first criterion of a universal health care system,40
even when coercing people into participation might violate certain liberties.41 He
argues that a universal health care system is moral42 because society would fail to
protect fair equality of opportunity if people have no universal access to an
appropriate array of medical resources regardless of their individual ability to pay.43
Furthermore, since health care, which protects fair equality of opportunity, is
extremely important, “the obligation to contribute to its support is more important
than any supposed liberty not to.”44
Since a great paradox lies beneath the universal health insurance mandate debate
in both Taiwan and the U.S., Taiwan’s experience clarifying the constitutionality of
its compulsory universal health insurance program then might provide valuable
lessons to the U.S. The goal of this Article is to provide a theoretical basis, based
upon the human rights impact assessment in public health policies45 and a Rawlsian
34

These states contend that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violates states’
constitutional rights because only states — not the federal government — can require citizens
to purchase health insurance. See Moyer, supra note 9.
35

Note, Universal Access to Health Care, 108 HARV. L REV. 1323, 1328-29 (1995).

36

Id. at 1328.

37

Id. at 1336-37.

38

Balkin agrees that the individual mandate might deter certain conduct that creates
negative externalities and is socially undesirable, but he argues that it is unavailing to contend
that the individual mandate is unconstitutional under existing law. Rivkin et al., supra note 29,
at 105.
39
Firstly, Norman Daniels did not want to discuss the issue about whether the premium
purchase should be compulsory because he has argued that this issue is better raised “when
fair shares are clearly large enough to purchase a reasonable insurance package.” Norman
Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10(2) PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146, 149 n.2
(1981).
40

NORMAN DANIELS, DONALD W. LIGHT, & RONALD L. CAPLAN, BENCHMARKS OF
FAIRNESS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 37-39 (1996).
41

Id. at 38.

42

Id. at 21-22.

43

NORMAN DANIELS, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, RESCUING UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE 3
(2007).
44
45

DANIELS, supra note 40, at 38.

According to Lawerence Gostin and Jonathan Mann, the human rights impact
assessment is “an instrument to help evaluate the effects of public health policies on human
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theory of justice, to decide whether the restriction on individual liberty imposed by
Taiwan’s compulsory NHI is constitutionally justified. An analytic four-step
assessment is established to evaluate the NHI’s burden on individual liberties: (1)
examine the importance, legitimacy, and contents of the freedom to purchase or
decline health insurance in social health programs, (2) clarify the NHI’s proposed
policy purposes, (3) evaluate likely policy effectiveness, and (4) apply the
“importance test,” based upon Rawls’ liberty and priority principles, to assess the
trade-offs between the restricted liberty and the pursued social benefits in the case of
NHI.
II. TAIWAN’S NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (NHI)
A. Background
Before March 1995, Taiwan had three major public medical insurance programs
covering approximately 54% of its residents: Labor Insurance, Government
Employee Insurance, and Farmers Insurance.46 Each program was supervised and
administered by a different government agency.47 In addition, military personnel,
who comprise about 2.3% of Taiwan’s population due to conscription, were given
free medical services at national armed forces hospitals and clinics.48 Because
consumer demand for health insurance was so low that the market for private
insurance essentially did not exist, Taiwan had virtually no private health insurance
programs.49 Therefore, 43.7% of the population in Taiwan was uninsured.50
On March 1, 1995, the centralized, universal National Health Insurance program
replaced the three existing health insurance programs.51 It was extended to cover
military officers in 2001.52 Taiwan’s Constitutional Court has deemed the NHI as

rights” (including freedoms and entitlements) and dignity. Lawerence Gostin & Jonathan M.
Mann, Towards the Development on a Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Formulation
and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 54
(Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999).
46

Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15, at 62.

47

See Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15, at 62. Labor Insurance was supervised and
administered by Bureau of Labor Insurance; Government Employee Insurance was supervised
and administered by Ministry of Civil Service; Farmers Insurance was supervised and
administered by Taiwan Provincial Government. Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15, at 62.
48

See Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15, at 62.

49

Ching-Lung William Hsiao & Jui-Fen Rachel Lu, Taiwan’s Health Care System and Its
Challenge for Future Development 10 (1989) (unpublished research paper, Harvard
University) (on file at Harvard University School of Public Health Library).
50

Id.

51

National Health Insurance Act. ch. IX, art. 87-4 (1994) (Taiwan), available at http://
www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&we
bdata_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). The Taiwan government argued that a centralized
and universal health insurance program could save administrative costs, improve health care
efficiency, and include the 43.7% of Taiwanese people who were uninsured. Id.
52

See Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15, at 62.
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realizing fundamental national policies mandated by the Taiwanese Constitution.53
According to Article 155 of the Constitution, “[t]he State, in order to promote social
welfare, shall establish a social insurance system . . . .”54 Article 157 also states that
“[t]he State, in order to improve national health, shall establish extensive services for
sanitation and health protection, and a system of public medical service.”55
Furthermore, Article 10(5) of the Constitution states that “[t]he State shall promote
universal health insurance . . . .” 56
Covering “all” medical services provided by physicians,57 the NHI pays for
medical care necessitated by illness, injury, and maternity (i.e. pregnancy and infant
delivery).58 In addition to the 54% of the population who were covered by the three
predecessor health care plans, the main beneficiaries of the NHI were the 42% of the
population, mostly the elderly and children, who were not covered by any of the
three predecessor public insurance plans.59 Today the NHI covers 96% of the
population classified into six types of insureds:60 (1) civil servants and government
53

Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (January 29, 1999) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
54

MINGUO XIANFA art. 155 (1946) (Taiwan).

55

MINGUO XIANFA art. 155 (1946) (Taiwan).

56

MINGUO XIANFA art. 10(5) (1991) (Taiwan).

57

It is different from the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in which
individuals are merely required to be covered under “minimum essential coverage.” Troy J.
Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization
and Regulatory Choice under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 280-81 (201011).
58
“During the insured term, in case of illness, injury or maternity occurred to the
beneficiary, benefits shall be provided under the provisions of this Act.” National Health
Insurance Act. ch. I, art. 2 (1994) (Taiwan), available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English
/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&webdata_id=1865 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2012).
59
Ching-Lung William Hsiao & Jui-Fen Rachel Lu, Taiwan’s Health Care System and Its
Challenge for Future Development 18 (1989) (unpublished research paper, Harvard
University) (on file at Harvard University School of Public Health Library).
60
Article 8, paragraph 1 of the National Health Insurance Act (Taiwan) classifies the
insured into six categories: “(1) Civil servants or full-time and regularly paid personnel in
governmental agencies and public/private schools; employees of publicly or privately owned
enterprises or institutions; employees other than the insured prescribed in the preceding two
subparagraphs but are otherwise employed by particular employers; employers or selfemployed owners of business; and independently practicing professionals and technicians; (2)
Members of an occupational union who have no particular employers, or who are selfemployed; and seamen serving on foreign vessels, who are members of the National Seamen's
Union or the Master Mariners' Association; (3) Members of the Farmers Association or the
Irrigation Association, or workers aged over fifteen who are actually engaged in agricultural
activities; and members of the Fishers Association who are either self-employed or have no
particular employers, or workers aged over fifteen who are actually engaged in fishery
activities; (4) Military servicemen whose compulsory service terms are over two months or
who are summoned to serve in military for more than two months, military school students
who receive grants from the government, military servicemen's dependents who lost their
support recognized by the Ministry of Defense, and military decedent's families who are
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agency personnel and public and private schools, employees of publicly or privately
owned enterprises or institutions, employers or self-employed owners of businesses,
and independently practicing professionals and technicians; (2) seamen (fishermen)
and occupational union members who have no particular employers, or who are selfemployed; (3) farmers; (4) voluntary military officers; (5) members of low-income
families as defined by the Social Support Law; and (6) veterans and wives of
veterans – and their children and dependents.61 The dependents of the insured
include unemployed spouses, lineal blood ascendants, and lineal blood descendants
who are under twenty years old and not employed, or who are over twenty years old,
but are incapable of making a living, or are in school without employment.62 The two
largest categories of the uninsured, about 4% of the population, are prisoners and
missing persons.63
According to National Health Insurance Act (“NHI Act”) Articles 11-164 and 6965
1, all residents who qualify for NHI are required to enroll in the NHI’s mandatory
insurance, which charges premiums proportionate to the annual income of the
insured.66 If a beneficiary does not enroll in the scheme after becoming eligible to do
so, he or she is subject to a fine ranging from NT$3,000 (about US $95) to
NT$15,000 (about US $470).67 Benefits are withheld or suspended until the fines and
receiving pensions due to the death of their decedents; and men at the age for enlisting in the
military, who are currently in military-substitute service; (5) Members of a household of lowincome families as defined by Social Support Law; (6) Veterans, household representatives of
survivors of veterans; representatives or heads of household other than the insured or their
dependents prescribed in previous categories.” National Health Insurance Act. ch. II, art. 8.
61
“The beneficiary of this Insurance includes the insured and his/her dependents.”
National Health Insurance Act. ch. II, art. 8
62

“The dependents of the insured . . . are prescribed as follows: (1) The insured's spouse
who is not employed; (2) The insured's lineal blood ascendants who are not employed; (3) The
insured's lineal blood descendants within second degree of relationship who are either under
twenty years of age and not employed, or are over twenty years of age but incapable of
making a living, including those who are in school without employment.” National Health
Insurance Act ch. II, art. 9.
63
“The following persons are not covered by this Insurance and shall be withdrawn from
it if they have subscribed to this Insurance: Those who are confined in the detention centers or
in prisons because of criminal punishment, rehabilitative disciplines, or reformatory
education, unless their terms are less than two months. Those who are subject to a protective
restriction order, however, are still covered by this Insurance.” National Health Insurance Act
ch. II, art. 11(1).
64

”Except for the circumstances prescribed in Article 11, all the beneficiaries qualified
under Article 10 shall subscribe to this Insurance.” National Health Insurance Act ch. II, art.
11-1.
65

“If a beneficiary who, in violation of the provisions of this Act, has not subscribed to
this Insurance, he/she shall be subject to a fine of no less than three thousand and no more
than fifteen thousand New Taiwan Dollars and shall subscribe to this Insurance
retrospectively from the date on which the beneficiary is qualified for insurance. The benefits
shall be suspended before the fines and premiums are fully paid.” National Health Insurance
Act ch. VIII, art. 69-1.
66

National Health Insurance Act ch. III, art. 27.

67

National Health Insurance Act ch. VIII, art. 69-1.
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premiums are fully paid.68 As a result, 99% of those eligible participate, and the NHI
covers almost all of the island’s twenty-three million people.69
Taiwan’s NHI is financed by employers, employees, and the government.70
Employers and employees contribute based on a sliding income-based scale while
the government funds a portion of services through its general budget.71 Employers
pay sixty percent of the premiums, employees pay thirty percent, and the
government pays ten percent.72 In addition, employers are required to enroll their
employees and employees’ dependents in the NHI within three days from the date on
which employees become eligible.73 If an employer fails to enroll an eligible
employee in the NHI, he or she can be fined a sum equal to twice the amount of the
unpaid premiums; premiums range from NT$911 (about US $28.62) to a maximum
of NT$9,598 (about US $301.54) per month.74
Taiwan’s NHI covers specific health care services provided by most health care
institutions, is a centralized single-payer system with standardized medical fees and
charges for medicines, procedures and checkups.75 While the NHI Act does not
prohibit private health insurers from offering alternative health care insurance plans,
the Ministry of Finance issued an order in 1995 “advising” private health insurers
not to provide similar health care services and coverage as provided by the NHI.76
Although this means that individuals are compelled to buy insurance through the
NHI, they have the liberty to freely choose physicians and hospitals themselves.77
B. Debates on the Constitutionality of the Compulsory NHI
On the one hand, Taiwan’s NHI advances the public health interests by treating
Taiwan’s citizens’ diseases and disabilities and protecting and promoting their
health. On the other hand, the NHI grants the government the authority to compel
68

Id.

69

See T. L. Chiang, supra note 13.

70

Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15 at 62.

71

Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15 at 62.

72

“The insured and their dependents referred to in items 2 and 3 of subparagraph 1,
paragraph 1 of Article 8 pay 30 percent of the premiums, and the group insurance applicants
pay 60 percent of them. For the other 10 percent of premium, it is subsidized by the central
government if they register in the provincial jurisdiction, or 5 percent subsidized by the central
government and another 5 percent subsidized by the municipal government if they register in
the municipal jurisdictions.” National Health Insurance Act ch. III, art. 27.
73
“The group insurance applicants shall subscribe to the Insurer for coverage within three
days from the date on which the beneficiaries meet the conditions of this Insurance and shall
withdraw from the coverage within three days from the date of occurrence of the cause for
withdrawal.” National Health Insurance Act ch. I, art. 16.
74

“If a group insurance applicant, which fails to carry out subscription to this Insurance
pursuant to Article 16 for the insured or their dependents, it shall be punished with an amount
equivalent to two times of the payable premiums in addition to the unpaid premium.” National
Health Insurance Act ch. VIII, art. 69.
75

Tsung-Mei Cheng, supra note 15 at 64.

76

The Ministry of Finance, Tai-Cai-Bao No. 840123987 (1995.3.8.) (Taiwan).

77

See id.

2013]

CAN COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE BE JUSTIFIED?

63

almost all citizens to enroll in the NHI and imposes upon citizens obligatory
premium payments into the NHI. This health care program is no doubt coercive
because it (1) limits citizens’ freedom to purchase health care plans or to choose to
go uninsured under the compulsory insurance clause, and (2) restricts citizens from
enrolling in other private health insurance plans under the universal insurance
clause.78 Despite this tension between the legitimate public interests served by the
NHI and the duties it imposes on citizens, it is clear from legislative discussions that
took place during the process of drafting and enacting the NHI Act that, in the
government’s view, the benefits of efficiency, universalism and solidarity of social
insurance79 outweigh the values of pluralism and the loss of freedom caused by the
individual mandate.80
This view has been tested and explored in several cases81 that were ultimately
brought before Taiwan’s constitutional court, which is known as the Council of
78
See generally National Health Insurance Act (1994) (Taiwan), available at http://www.
nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&webdata
_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). Even though the Taiwanese government does not forbid
NHI members to buy a second health insurance plan (similar to the German health care
system), most citizens, especially middle class laborers or low wage earners, cannot afford to
buy an additional health insurance due to their limited resources. But under the regulations of
the NHI, health care resources are distributed by the NHI, and the individual is compelled to
use his or her limited resources to subscribe the NHI or to pay a fine. In this case, the freedom
to choose a health care plan is substantially influenced. On the contrary, if an affluent
individual or family has the financial ability to buy more than one health insurance plan, the
compulsory regulations of the NHI would influence his or her less in terms of his or her
freedom to choose health care plans. Thus, the rich individual has relatively more income to
support the values embedded in liberty. This issue is related to the worth of liberty rather than
liberty per se, thus I will not discuss this issue at length in this paper.
79

In short, “[t]he principle of universalism is . . . rooted in the . . . welfare state, in
which . . . taxes are combined with public provision and a compulsory social insurance system
that has allowed . . . benefit levels to compensate for income losses at every stage of life.”
Peter Garpenby, Health Care Reform in Sweden in the 1990s: Local Pluralism Versus
National Coordination, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 695, 713 (1995).
80

See, e.g., THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE: NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ACT 55,
342, 350, 358, 794, 805-07, 941-45, 951-52, 962 (The Legislative Yuan Secretariat ed., 1994)
(Taiwan).
81

See, e.g., Taiwan Taichung District Court Civil Judgment of (86) Bao Sian Jiang Shan
Zhi No. 2 (1997) (Taiwan). In this case, because the plaintiff refused to subscribe to the NHI,
the National Health Insurance Bureau in accordance with Article 69-1 of the NHI Act
imposed monetary fines on him. Id. The plaintiff then sued the Bureau for a violation of
property rights. Id. The Taiwan Taichung District Court held that the NHI regulations,
including the individual mandate and the monetary punishment, are justified. Id. In addition,
legislators of not only the opposition party (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) but also the
government party (Kuomintang, KMT) also request (separately) the Grand Justices Council to
examine the constitutionality of the NHI’s individual mandate clauses (Articles 11-1 and 691), in accordance to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3, of the Constitutional
Interpretation Procedure Act (“[t]he grounds on which the petitions for interpretation of the
Constitution may be made are as follows: … [w]hen one-third of the Legislators or more have
doubt about the meanings of a constitutional provision governing their functions and duties, or
question on the constitutionality of a statute at issue, and have therefore initiated a petition.”)
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act ch. II, art. 5(1) (1993) (China).
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Grand Justices. In particular, the Council was asked to determine whether the NHI’s
individual mandate was unconstitutional as violating citizens’ individual liberty.82 In
1999 the Council held in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 472 (Shizi No. 472) that
the individual mandate provisions in Articles 11-1 and 69-1of the NHI Act are not
unconstitutional because the restriction on individual liberty is justified as a means to
promote social welfare and to improve national health.83 However, the Council also
stated that “the authorities concerned shall … conduct at an appropriate time a fullrange evaluation and implement improvement measures in aspects of the insurance
operations (including diversification of the insurers), categories of the insured, the
insured amount, premium rates, payment of medical insurance, austerity measures
and the appropriateness of temporary suspension of insurance benefits.”84 In other
words, the Council agreed that the universal compulsory health insurance serves the
constitutional objective of establishing a system of social security and the public
policy goal of allowing the state to meet the health care needs of the disadvantaged.85
It also placed the individual mandate under a constitutional scrutiny to explore
whether its implementation meets those policy objectives.86
Although the Council held that the NHI’s individual mandate did not
significantly restrict individual liberty as to outweigh the state’s constitutional and
public policy objectives, it failed to analyze the extent of those restrictions in depth.87
In the joint concurring opinion, Grand Justice Jyun-hsyong Su expressed
concerns that, when it examined the constitutionality of the NHI’s individual
mandate the Council failed to consider how the individual mandate, as
enacted, might undervalue individual autonomy and ignored less intrusive
alternative policies that might achieve the public health objectives as well as
or better than the individual mandate. 88 For example, the Council analyzed the
individual mandate by simply concluding that the utility principle applied:
“[p]rovisions … regarding compulsory subscription of insurance and premium
payment are based on considerations over mutual social support, risk-sharing and
public interests, and therefore conform to the constitutional purpose of promoting
national health insurance.”89 It did not discuss the issues of individual liberty, nor did
it explore how the individual mandate might affect individual liberty if imposed in
conjunction with different policy instruments (e.g., single-payer or multiple-payer

82

Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (Jan. 29, 1999) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
83

Id.

84

See id.

85

In addition to improving national health, the social benefits the NHI Act sought to
pursue also include controlling administrative costs and enhancing economic efficiency. Id.
86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

The Grand Justice Council further argued that the compulsory mechanism is necessary
for the public national health insurance because without such a mechanism public health
insurance would be unfairly placed at a “competitive disadvantage.” Id.
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system).90 Moreover, the Council also failed to require the state to assess important
aspects of the NHI’s operations, such as the effects of diversifying the insurers
beyond a state-administrated single-payer. This type of assessment in particular
cases might lead Taiwan to revise its appreciation of the NHI’s individual mandate.91
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREEDOM TO PURCHASE OR DECLINE HEALTH
INSURANCE
The lacunae in the Council of Grand Justice’s decision is attributed in part to an
absence of tenable criterion to accurately assess the trade-offs between the
compulsory NHI’s restrictions on individual liberty and the state’s pursued public
policy objectives. This absence of criterion occurs because of the vagueness and the
undecided nature of the significance of the freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance. There has been debate over whether the freedom to purchase or decline
health insurance without government intrusion is a “basic liberty.”92 This debate also
questions whether this same freedom is relevant to individuals’ use of reason to form
their own conceptions of the good and their ability to judge and regulate the basic
social structure. Wei-In Tsai, amongst others,93 argue that if the freedom to purchase
or decline health insurance is a basic liberty, social solidarity—promoting social
welfare and improving national health—might not be a strong enough justification
for the restrictions the NHI’s individual mandate imposes.94 However, when
assessing the individual mandate, the significance of the freedom to purchase or
decline health insurance was ignored, increasing health insurance coverage for all
citizens was clearly the priority.
90
Taiwan’s compulsory health insurance adopts the single-payer system. Peter Hussey &
Gerard Anderson, A Comparison of Single- and Multi-Payer Health Insurance Systems and
Options for Reform, 66 HEALTH POL’Y 215, 215 (2003). Generally speaking, single payer
systems can effectively distribute risks throughout one larger risk pool and offer governments
a high degree of control over the total expenditure on health. See infra Part VIII. On the other
hand, multi-payer systems would sacrifice this control for a greater ability to meet the diverse
preferences of beneficiaries. See infra Part VIII.
91

See generally Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court
(Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (Jan. 29,
1999) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.
asp?expno=472.
92
According to Rawls, basic liberties are a primary social good that every rational person
is presumed to want (no matter what he or she may hope or plan to get out of life) because
these liberties are the background institutional conditions necessary for the development and
the full informed exercise of moral powers (the capacity for a conception of the good and the
capacity for a sense of justice). JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53, 176-80, 266 (2003);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 310-24 (Columbia University Press ed., 1996).
Therefore, it is important to guarantee each person an equal right to the most extensive system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a fully adequate system of liberty for all.
93
WEIYIN CAI, ANALYZING BASIC ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE FROM THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 49, 66-76 (Taibei Xian Tucheng Shi ed.,
2008) (Chinese).
94
For example, according to Rawls, “a basic liberty can be limited or denied only for the
sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never for a greater public good understood as a
greater net sum of social and economic advantages for a society as a whole.” JOHN RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 111 (2001).
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This ignorance may be illustrated by comparing the alternative approach adopted
by the Japanese Constitutional Court and the conclusions of the Taiwanese Council
of Grand Justices. In 1958, the Japanese Constitutional Court held that the individual
mandate for health insurance did not violate fundamental constitutional rights
because the freedom to decline health insurance was not a basic liberty.95 The Court
argued that fundamental constitutional rights (or basic liberties) should be limited to
the “core values,” related to the formation or revision of an individual’s personality
and integrity. In terms of the freedom of thought and conscience,96 the core values
are normally established within, and interpreted by, certain religious, philosophical,
or moral doctrines in light of how the various aims of those values are understood
and ordered.97 Since the proposed freedom to decline health insurance cannot be
found in any of the religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines recognized by the
Court, it did not satisfy the requirements for being a core value.98 The freedom to
decline health insurance was thus not recognized as a basic liberty within
constitutional pantheon and, therefore, was denied any special or priority status for
protection.99 Namely, if the state could prove that denying individuals the freedom to
decline health insurance actually helped those individuals realizing their interest in
mutual social support and risk-sharing, then the individual mandate for the Japanese
Medical Care Insurance System was constitutionally justified.100
Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices concluded that denying the freedom to
decline health insurance by the NHI Act was justified as a means to promote social
welfare and national health.101 Unlike the Japanese Constitutional Court, the majority
of Taiwan’s Grand Justices thought that the freedom to refuse to enroll in the NHI
was a fundamental constitutional freedom, or a basic liberty, vital to every person’s
rights to develop his or her own personality and to self-determination.102 According
to Grand Justice Jyun-hsyong Su, the freedom to decline health insurance is
strongly related to an individual’s right to freely decide how to use benefits, receive
benefits, and dispose of resources needed for their livelihood.103 Furthermore, even
though the freedom to decline health insurance is a “non-enumerated freedom” under
the Taiwanese Constitution,104 Grand Justice Chen-Shan Li argued that this freedom
95

See generally Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 12, 1958, Hei 12(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŪ
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHū] 190 (Japan); see also Yi An Chen, Patient-Physician
Relationships Under the National Health Insurance Act 44 (1996) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Soochow University) (on file with the National Library) (Taiwan).
96

NIHONKOKU KENPÔ [KENPÔ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 19 (Japan).

97

Yi An Chen, supra note 95.

98

Yi An Chen, supra note 95.

99

Yi An Chen, supra note 95.

100

Yi An Chen, supra note 95.

101

Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (Jan. 29, 1999) (Taiwan)
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
102

Id.

103

Id.; see also WEIYIN CAI, supra note 93.

104

According to the Taiwanese Constitution, the enumerated constitutional rights include:
(1) personal freedom (Article 8), (2) freedom of residence and of change of residence (Article
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could still be recognized as a legally enforceable fundamental constitutional
freedom105 if: (1) it shares characteristics relevant to identification of fundamental
freedoms and rights;106 (2) it relates to intimate and important decisions about one’s
life or relationships;107 (3) it does not interfere with the survival of society or the
functioning of important institutions within it;108 and (4) its existence does not
violate or restrict the fundamental rights of others.109 In other words, although the
10), (3) freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication (Article 11), (4) freedom of
privacy of correspondence (Article 12), (5) freedom of religious belief (Article 13), (6)
freedom of assembly and association (Article 14), (7) right to equal protection (Article 7), (8)
right of existence, the right of work, the right of property, (9) right of presenting petitions,
lodging complaints, or instituting legal proceedings (Article16), (10) right of election, recall,
initiative and referendum.(Article 17), (11) right of taking public examinations and of holding
public offices (Article 18), (12) right of receiving citizens’ education (Article 21). MINGUO
XIANFA (1947) (Taiwan).
105

Chen-Shan Li, The Multiple Dimensions of Non-Enumerated Constitutional Rights:
Focusing on the Article 22 of the R.O.C. Constitution, PLURALITY, TOLERANCE, AND THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOCUSING ON THE PROTECTION OF NON-ENUMERATED RIGHTS
33-40 (Chen-Shan Li ed., 2005) (Chinese). In addition, according to Article 22, nonenumerated (unnamed) freedoms or rights “that are not detrimental to social order or public
welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution.” MINGUO XIANFA (1947) (Taiwan).
106

For example, in Shizi No. 399 the Grand Justices Council argued that the right of an
individual to select his or her own name is a type of personal right because the name of an
individual signifies an aspect of his or her personality. CONST. CT. INTERP. No. 399, The
Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial
Yuan Interpretation) No. 399 (March 22, 1996) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.
gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=399. Therefore, the right to choose one's
own name is a physical freedom safeguarded under Article 22 of the Constitution because the
name of an individual, which this right intends to protect, signifies an aspect of his or her
personality. Id.
107
For example, in Shizi No. 585 the Grand Justices Council argued that, even though the
right of privacy is not enumerated constitutional rights, the right should be regarded as a
fundamental right protected under Article 22 of the Constitution because it is a necessary tool
for the protection of human dignity, the full development of personality, and the guarantee of
an individual’s ability to autonomously make his or her own decisions in the private sphere
without psychological pressure, which comes from the objections or control of other people.
CONST. CT. INTERP. No. 585, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 585 (December 15, 2004)
(Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno
=585.
108

For example, in Shizi No. 242 the Grand Justices Council argued that if a restriction on
freedoms or rights would “significantly disrupt the family life and human relations and lead to
social disorder,” such a restriction would be “in conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution
which provides that people's freedoms and rights shall be protected.” CONST. CT. INTERP. No.
242, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi
(Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 242 (June 23, 1989) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judi
cial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=242.
109
According to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, “the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9, 79 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed.,
1978). Therefore, the only circumstance under which the state may restrict the liberty and
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freedom to decline health insurance is not an enumerated constitutional freedom, this
fact alone should not be a sufficient justification for restricting this freedom.110 The
constitutional significance of the freedom to decline health insurance should be
decided independently on the basis of whether such a freedom is a harmless and
necessary means for an individual to pursue his own ends in planning his life.111
Unfortunately, the Council did not analyze the extent of the freedom to decline
health insurance in depth, nor did the Council assess the burdens on freedom
imposed by the compulsory NHI.112 The Council also did not thoroughly analyze the
trade-off between the need to protect the freedom to decline health insurance and the
utility of Taiwan’s universal individual mandate.
While the Japanese Constitutional Court and the Taiwanese Council of Grand
Justices disagreed on whether the freedom to decline health insurance was a
fundamental constitutional freedom, both courts agreed that the “core values” – the
essential conditions for the adequate development of personality and integrity –
would be dispositive to the question of whether the state could justifiably deny or
restrict the freedom to decline health insurance.113 However, the Taiwanese Council
recognized that restricting the freedom to decline health insurance could
significantly violate core constitutional values but failed to explore whether it
violated those values. In contrast, the Japanese Court concluded that the alleged
absence of the freedom to decline health insurance from any recognized moral,
religious, or philosophical system precluded it from being such a value.114 In other
words, both courts failed to give serious consideration to the constitutional
significance, or core values, of the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance
when analyzing the constitutionality of compulsory health care plans.

coerce an individual is if such a restriction will prevent harm from befalling persons other than
the individual. It is because “when … a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable
obligation to [others], the case is taken out of the self-regarding class and becomes amenable
to moral disapprobation.” Nils Holtug, The Harm Principle, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRACTICE 357, 357-89 (2002).
110

The 9th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also assumes the existence of certain
unnamed rights. It argues that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
111

According to Amartya Sen, the inflexible (or fixed) fundamental freedoms index might
wrongfully assume that everyone has shared purposes (or common ends), and ignore the fact
that individuals vary in their ability to convert fundamental freedoms into what is important to
them. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 80-82 (1992); AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE,
WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 365-66 (1982).
112

See generally Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court
(Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (Jan. 29,
1999) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01
.asp?expno=472.
113

Id.; Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 12, 1958, Hei 12(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHū] 190 (Japan).
114
See generally Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court
(Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (Jan. 29,
1999) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?
expno=472.
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A number of prominent thinkers on the nature of justice and liberty have argued
that a liberty should be recognized as a core value if that liberty is essential to an
individual’s basic capability to formulate and express intimate and important
decisions about his or her life or relationships.115 For example, according to John
Rawls, a liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or less
involved in the full and informed exercise of the moral powers (so-called “the central
range of application” of a liberty).116 For Rawls, the moral powers are the capacities
for the conception of the good and a sense of justice.117 In other words, the “core
values” (or those values with constitutional significance) of a liberty should be
defined by the central range of application and related to an individual’s fundamental
interests—maintaining the basic capabilities to exercise moral powers as a free and
equal member of the society.118 Therefore, when evaluating the core values of the
freedom to purchase or decline health insurance, society should consider not only the
free advocacy of religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines as the Japanese
Constitutional Court did, but also the essential social conditions for the adequate
development and full exercise of moral powers. Furthermore, if the freedom to
purchase or decline health insurance is essential to the moral powers, then it is not
only a core value, but also a fundamental constitutional freedom that can be
recognized and enforced when the state decides to trade off liberty to pursue its
constitutional and public policy goals.
For these reasons, the following sections will delineate why the compulsory NHI
should be carefully assessed for its impact on individual liberty based upon a human
rights impact assessment.119 This assessment could be used to introduce criterion to
evaluate the significance of the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance and
to show how the NHI compulsory health insurance scheme affects this freedom.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMPULSORY NHI
Taiwan’s and Japan’s experiences show that, even though the individual mandate
for health insurance can achieve valid constitutional public health policy objectives,
the constitutionality of the individual mandate should nonetheless be carefully
evaluated. To clarify the constitutionality of Taiwan’s compulsory NHI by means of
an assessment of the impact this mandate has on human rights, I propose the
115
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 18-19, 111, 168-70 (2001); Martha
Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, WOMEN, CULTURE, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 85-86 (Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995); AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 63-64 (1987); Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] Jan. 12, 1958, Hei 12(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŪ MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHū] 190
(Japan). In other words, fundamental freedoms (or basic liberties) are those freedoms that can
protect and fulfill an individual’s basic capabilities because these capabilities would consist of
many distinct and essential interests in the individual’s rational life plan - interests that could
not simply be reduced to quantities.
116

RAWLS, supra note 115, at 113.

117

RAWLS, supra note 115, at 18-19.

118

An individual’s fundamental interests are consistent with the full exercise of moral
powers to develop a conception of the good and a sense of justice because these moral powers
are necessary institutional means for individuals to become engaged in social cooperation as a
free and equal member of society. RAWLS, supra note 115, at 111, 113, 168-70.
119

Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 55.
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following four analytic steps, with a series of questions designed to balance the
public benefits of the NHI against its burdens on individual liberty120 (see Figure 1):
(1) First, the burden NHI imposes upon human rights and individual
liberty should be examined, thus determining whether the compulsory
NHI restricts a given liberty and what aspects of that liberty may have
been infringed (see infra, Section V).
(2) Second, the NHI’s policy goals should be clarified in order to assess
whether the NHI could or does achieve its objectives. (see infra, Section
VI).
(3) Third, the effectiveness of the NHI should be evaluated in order to
assess whether the NHI provides the least restrictive means to achieve its
proposed purpose. (see infra, Section VII).
(4) Fourth, the trade-off between restrictions on individual liberty and the
proposed public order realized by the NHI should be analyzed (the
importance test). The court should carefully consider whether there is an
acceptable trade-off between the restricted liberty and the policy
objectives served by the NHI’s individual mandate. The importance test is
based upon John Rawls’ analytical approach (the liberty principle and the
priority principle) in the theory of justice (see infra, Section VIII), and is
applied to assess these trade-offs. Two separate but related policy
elements, the compulsory scheme and the single-payer system, and their
influences on the central application range of individual liberty, are
further analyzed in this step (see infra, Sections VIII(C) and (D)).
If the answer to any one of these issues raised in steps 2 thru 4 is “no”, enacting
the compulsory NHI and restricting individual liberty is unjustified.121

120

This assessment is modified on the basis of the human rights impact assessment for the
formulation and evaluation of public health policies, proposed by Lawrence Gostin and
Jonathan Mann in 1994. See Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 54-77. I also proposed to apply
a similar assessment to evaluate restrictions on the right to health under the international trade
regime. See generally Chuan-Feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns Within the
Framework of International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 141, 184-95 (2010).
121
Arguments about whether compulsory health insurance is justified in restricting
citizens’ property rights would not be considered here. My aim is to resolve the tension
between individuals’ liberty and public order on the basis of the human rights impact
assessment and the priority of basic liberties.
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Figure 1. Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Health Care Policy
Step 1

Examine burdens on human rights

Step 2

Clarify the purposes of health care policies
• clear purposes
• adequate relationship

Step 3

Evaluate effectiveness of health care policies

Step 4

Assess trade-off relationships in health care policies
• importance test – moral powers (conception of good, and value of justice)
– lexical order of liberties

Priority rule

Public interest rule

After conducting a careful analysis, this Article concludes that, even though
Taiwan’s compulsory NHI has a clear and achievable policy purpose of pursuing
economic efficiency,122 the compulsory scheme is unjustified because it is not the
least restrictive means to achieve the intended purpose123 because it substantially
restricts individuals’ freedom to purchase or decline health insurance.124 Limited
compulsory health insurance (requiring only segments of the population to enroll in
social health insurance) is less intrusive and will achieve a similar purpose. In
addition, the NHI’s individual mandate alone does not fail the importance test
because it does not hinder individuals from developing a conception of the good or a
sense of justice. However, accompanied by the single-payer system, the NHI’s
compulsory scheme impinges the central application range of individual liberty,
imposes restrictions on the exercise of moral powers, infringes upon the priority of
liberty, and fails the importance test.125
V. STEP 1: EXAMINE HUMAN RIGHTS BURDENS OF THE COMPULSORY NHI
Even in a well-designed health care policy, the burdens on human rights and
individual liberty may outweigh social benefits and economic interests.126 Therefore,
it is important to identify and evaluate all potential infringements on human rights.127
Defining human rights burdens requires a fact-finding process in order to examine
different perspectives regarding what human rights are affected by health care
122

See infra Part VI.

123

See infra Part VII.

124

See infra Part V.

125

See infra Part VIII.

126

Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 69-70.

127

Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 70.
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policy. The nature and contents of restricted human rights and the degree of
invasiveness should be clarified in the assessment. For example, in order to assess
burdens on individual liberty imposed by Taiwan’s universal compulsory NHI, first
we need to explore whether individual liberty includes an individual’s selfdetermination to purchase or to refuse to enroll in a health care plan and outline what
aspect of the liberty is impacted. International human rights documents and domestic
statutes and cases may be considered the source of basic rights and liberties. Even
though these documents merely provide a cursory basis, in this step it is sufficient to
provide a starting point to recognize what rights and liberties might be infringed
upon. In other words, if there is “reasonable doubt” about whether the compulsory
NHI violates individual rights and liberties, we can then move from this initial
examination to the next step. Whether the restriction on these rights and liberties is
justified will be evaluated later.
One debate regarding the relationship between individual insureds and health
insurers,128 especially in governmental health insurance programs, is whether
individuals have the freedom to autonomously choose to enroll in health insurance or
not, and which health insurance plans are included in this freedom. For example,
respect for individualism and pluralism and a fear of the seemingly limitless
governmental authority are the main reasons why the U.S. had no universal national
health insurance program.129 Even though this perspective has been challenged with
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Due to rising medical
costs and health care market failures in the country, American society continues to
seek a balanced relationship between individual autonomy and public interests.130
Western European countries with well-developed public social insurance also debate
whether the governmental authority in social insurance has excessively intervened
with individual autonomy.131 Unfortunately, there is no international declaration or
128
Individuals’ liberty (or patient autonomy) in the relationship between individuals and
health insurers have received more attention over the past 20 years because health insurance
and publicly-funded health care programs have become an important part of the social welfare
system (e.g., the U.S. Medicaid and U.S. Medicare program, the U.K. National Health Service
(NHS), Taiwan’s NHI, Germany’s Public Contract Model, and Japan’s Public Medical Care
Insurance System). ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
REFORM OF HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN OECD COUNTRIES 57, 11315 (1992). For example, the 2005 U.S. Patients’ Bill of Rights focuses not only on traditional
patients’ rights (between the patients and their physicians and hospitals) but also on medical
consumers’ rights (between patients and health insurers). ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE REFORM OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
REVIEW OF SEVENTEEN OECD COUNTRIES 208-09 (1994); Patients’ Bill of Rights Act of 2005,
H.R. 2259, 109th Cong. (2005).
129

It appears that American society places more value on pluralism than on universalism,
and requires the states to respect free market mechanisms and democracy even in health care
issues. DANIELS ET AL., supra note 40, at 4-9; HOFFMAN, supra note 31, at 45-60.
130
131

HOFFMAN, supra note 31.

See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Cost Sharing for Health Care: France, Germany,
and Switzerland (Jan. 2009), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7852.pdf; Anna Dixon,
Martin Pfaff & Jean Hermesse, Solidarity and Competition in Social Health Insuance
Countries, SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE 179-80 (Richard B.
Saltman, Reinhard Busse & Josep Figueras eds., 2004); Jorine Muiser, The New Dutch Health
Insurance Scheme: Challenges and Opportunities for Better Performance in Health
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domestic law directly protecting the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance.
Therefore, this freedom can only be exercised on the basis of the historical
development of patients’ rights and upon the more general liberties such as civil and
political rights. Readers must remain cognizant that the reorganization of the
freedom to purchase or decline health insurance is not equivalent to supporting a free
market in health care. Even if the individual has the freedom to refuse to enroll in a
health care plan, such a freedom ought not to be taken as an absolute principle in
health care policymaking, and can be regulated in order to pursue the greater social
benefits or to strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all.132
There are four different perspectives on the status of the freedom to purchase or
decline health insurance in social health insurance systems.
A. Taiwanese Constitution
First, in Taiwan, the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance can be
derived from Article 22 of the Constitution, which states that “[a]ll other freedoms
and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare
shall be guaranteed under the Constitution.”133 In other words, the only purpose for
which power can be justifiably exercised over any member of a civilized society
against his or her will to interfere with liberty is to prevent harm to others.134 In Shizi
No. 472, Grand Justices Sen-Yen Sun and Jyun-hsyong Su argued that compulsory
health insurance, especially the individual mandate clause, would significantly
restrict individuals’ liberty. Such restrictions especially include the freedom of
personality development and self-determination,135 which is generally protected in
the Constitution.136 In other words, in Taiwan, the freedom to purchase or decline
Financing, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2007), available at http://www.who.int/health_
financing/documents/dp_e_07_3-new_dutch_healthinsurance.pdf; Romke van der Veen,
Managed Competition and Managed Care in Dutch Health Care Reform: A Sociological
Analysis Of Organisational And Policy Developments In Dutch Health Care (2008),
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/13553/van_der_veen__2008_organisatio
nal_and_policy_developments.pdf.
132

When exploring the relationship between the power of the classical liberal and the
modern social welfare model, Richard Epstein also argues that “one must examine these
issues from a comprehensive perspective that understands the profound interaction between
public health and private wealth creation.” Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public
Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421,
1470 (2004).
133

MINGUO XIANFA art. 22 (1946) (Taiwan).

134

Similar conceptions can be found in John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which asserts
that the state cannot restrict behavior (individuals’ liberty) when that behavior does not harm
others. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
135

Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (January 29, 1999) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
136
For example, in Shizi Nos. 603 and 664, the Taiwanese Grand Justice Council
established that the freedom of personality development should be regarded as the core value
of the constitutional structure of free democracy, and is an indispensable fundamental right
protected under Article 22 of the Constitution for purposes of preserving human dignity,
individuality, and moral integrity. Const. Ct. Interp. No. 603, The Republic of China
Constitutional Court (Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation)
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health insurance is regarded as a constitutional fundamental freedom and should be
respected on the basis of individualism and pluralism. Taking this into consideration,
the NHI’s compulsory health insurance scheme is a coercive program that
substantially regulates an individual’s liberty.
B. Individual Autonomy
Second, from the libertarian perspective, individuals should have the right to optout of health care plans on autonomy-based grounds. Libertarians believe that
“greater consumer choice in the purchase of health insurance would better line up the
interests of the buyers and insurers.”137 Libertarians also argue that individual
liberties should be respected by allowing purchasers the freedom to choose insurance
contract terms.138 Because using a person to benefit others “does not sufficiently
respect and take into account of the fact that he is a separate person,”139 the
individual mandate for health insurance, which requires some individuals to sacrifice
their good for the benefit of others,140 would violate the principle of individual
liberty.141 In addition, the individual mandate seems paternalistic,142 in that it fails to
respect individuals’ incommensurable conceptions of the good regarding health care,
which in turn reflects or indicates the diversity of their final ends and aspirations that
they have formulated in their life plans.
The patient autonomy theory also expresses concerns about guaranteeing the
liberty of every adult person of sound mind to determine what shall be done with his
or her own body.143 Since patient autonomy implies self-determination, self-rule, and
liberty in the health care field,144 the doctrine of autonomous decision-making should
No. 603 (September 28, 2005) (Taiwan); Const. Ct. Interp. No. 664, The Republic of China
Constitutional Court (Grand Justices Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation)
No. 664 (July 31, 2009) (Taiwan).
137

Regina E. Herzlinger, Finding “Truth” About Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 1077, 1080 (1999).
138
Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination
of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1385 (2007).
139

According to Robert Nozick, “there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by
others so as to lead to a greater overall social good” and “[t]here is no justified sacrifice of
some of us for others.” ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974).
140

The main reason to prompt the individual mandate is to prevent adverse selection
because adverse selection, a phenomenon that occurs when high-risk patients select a
particular health care plan and cause major financial hardships, would induce premium
increases and financial burdens on the poor. See infra Part VI. In other words, by sacrifices
some individuals’ monetary assets, others would be able to receive more affordable health
insurance.
141

Monahan, supra note 138.

142

Epstein, supra note 132.

143

Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914) (supporting the claim
that patients have the right to make nonconforming medical decisions).
144
For example, patient autonomy can be directly applied to support informed consent or
informed choice, and the right to refuse medical treatment. Marshall B. Kapp, Patient
Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent and Informed
Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 93 (2007).
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be expanded to apply to health care choices across the board—including both
clinical and non-clinical aspects of one's own health care.145 On the one hand,
patients have a clear right to make their own clinical decisions to determine what
medical treatments they want (e.g., the right to decide to or not to undergo medical
treatments, and the right to choose diagnostic or screening tests, therapeutic
procedures or medications, and research protocols).146 On the other hand, it also
follows from patient autonomy that patients have the right to make non-clinical
decisions regarding general health care issues such as health care plans,
immunization policies, and health education (e.g., choosing health care financial
packages from among an array of personal savings, private insurance, and public
health care programs) because of the influence these non-clinical decisions have on
the accessibility, affordability, and quality of health care.147 Therefore, it logically
follows that individuals have a liberty, grounded in patient autonomy, to freely
decide to (or not to) purchase a health care plan, and what health care plan to
purchase.148
Though some argue that the state should grant the exclusive authority to mandate
health benefits149 and such a mandate is necessary for the uninsured,150 nonetheless
many do not deny that coercing people into purchasing health insurance would
restrict certain liberties.151 Instead of denying the existence of the freedom to
purchase or decline health insurance (as revealed in the Japanese Constitutional
Court’s decision152), some try to justify the individual mandate and its restrictions on
individual liberty by arguing that “the obligation to contribute to [mandatory
coverage of health insurance] is more important than any supposed liberty not to”
because the public good at issue here is extremely important.153 Thus, even those
who argue in favor of the universal compulsory health insurance admit that the
freedom to purchase or decline health insurance should be recognized and respected
as embedded in the liberal notions of autonomy.

145

Id.

146

Id. at 92.

147

Id.

148

The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons also recognized patients’
freedom to “use their own resources to purchase the care of their choice.” Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., The Principles of Medical Ethics of the Association
of American Physicians and Surgeons, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS (Jan. 1991), available at http://www.aapsonline.org/brochures/princip.htm.
149

Carol S. Weissert, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to Universal Health
Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42, 42 (2004).
150
Id. at 46-50; Daniel Gottlieb, You can Take this Health Insurance and … Mandate It?
33 Seton Hall Legis. J. 535, 540-43 (2009); DANIELS ET AL., supra note 40, at 142-144.
151

Weissert, supra note 149, at 38. PAT ARMSTRONG, HUGH ARMSTRONG & CLAUDIA
FEGAN, UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE 123 (1998).
152

Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 12, 1958, Hei 12(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŪ MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHū] 190 (Japan).
153

DANIELS ET AL., supra note 40.
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C. Moral Powers
Third, the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance should be regarded as
fundamental because it protects individuals’ ability to make autonomous health care
decisions, which are value-laden, dependent on one’s perceived final ends, and
related to the individual’s own conceptions of the good.154 This point is further
supported by Rawls's model of justice, in which a list of basic rights and liberties can
be drawn up analytically: “we consider what liberties provide the political and social
conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral
powers (capacities for the conception of the good and the sense of justice) of free
and equal persons.”155 Thus, the freedom to purchase or decline insurance is
fundamental because it enables individuals to exercise moral powers in forming,
revising and rationally pursuing their own conceptions of the good regarding health
care. Without this freedom, individuals can hardly make choices—which reflect the
profound and sometimes irreconcilable differences in their moral and philosophical
values156 —among reasonable alternatives (e.g., different medical interventions)
proposed by different health care programs.
More specifically, medical interventions reflect the integrated physical and
mental functions that the individual expects to reap by receiving such interventions,
and these functions (e.g., restoring the body’s functional parts from a disease) reflect
the individual’s own conception of the good (e.g., having functional body parts). 157
Therefore, the freedom to make health care decisions permits an individual not only
to freely choose between different medical interventions, but also to choose between
different conceptions of the good.158 In short, when an individual chooses between
different health care programs, at the same time he or she is also making choices
154

According to Rawls, “[the conception of the good] is an ordered family of final ends and
aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively,
of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life. The elements of such a conception are normally
set within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral
doctrines in the light of which the various ends and aims are ordered and understood.” RAWLS,
supra note 94, at 19. Because healthcare decisions are value-laden (on the basis of one’s
perceived final ends) and are related to the individual’s conception of the good, such decisions
then reflect individuals’ conceptions of the good. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 19.
155

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 44-45.

156

For example, some societal subgroups (such as Jehovah's Witnesses) might have
distinctive views on health care, and their health care decisions are strongly related to their
religious values rather than to their perceived individual physical and mental benefits. See,
e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996) (involving refusal of blood
transfusion by Jehovah's Witness); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) (linking the
constitutional right of freedom of religion and the right to refuse medical treatment).
157
Here I treat the fulfillment of health care needs as a valuable good in the life plan. I
believe that Rawls would agree with this, because he also argues that the fulfillment of basic
human needs could be regarded as goodness. See RAWLS, supra note 115, at 141.
158
Furthermore, in addition to the micro perspective, the macro perspective also verifies
that health care decisions are value laden. Because sometimes people make healthcare
decisions as members of a group (e.g., as Catholics), healthcare decisions then not only
respond to an individual’s preference of utility (or function), but also reflect an individual’s
moral or religious values flowing from his or her general commitments to the group. See
generally, Vega, 674 A.2d at 824, 825; In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 822.
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between different medical interventions, which reflect the individual’s own
conceptions of the good.159 Therefore, the freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance—which assures that an individual can freely form carefully considered
goals and desires, as well as the ability to fulfill such goals and desires160—then
becomes a necessary means for the individual to fully and freely exercise the moral
power to pursue the conceptions of the good.161
Figure 2. The Health Care Decision-Making Process
Health care decisions

Medical intervention A
(e.g., palliative care)

Medical intervention B
(e.g., radiology therapy)

Function α
(e.g., enhancing life quality)

Function β
(e.g., prolonging life)

reflect

reflect

Conception of good α

Conception of good β

D. Historical Development
Fourth, the development of health care policies worldwide also shows continuing
emphasis on individual liberty to purchase or decline health care insurance. For
example, even though European countries generally believe there are good reasons
for compulsory health insurance, they have faced challenges to this view based on
individual liberty.162 In Germany, trade unions believed that compulsory health
insurance (proposed in the Health Insurance Act in 1883) would be a paternalistic
reform creating a system of state supervision of the peoples’ health.163 As a result of
this concern, even today those with an income above a certain threshold (€48,150 per
year in 2008)164 are still allowed to choose whether to opt out of the statutory health
insurance.165 Thus, the extent of compulsoriness within the social health insurance
159

See infra Figure 2.

160

TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58-61
(2001).
161
This research focuses mainly on the relationship between the disenrollment freedom and
the capacity to conceptualize what is good because such a freedom is irrelevant to the capacity
for the sense of justice.
162
PAUL V. DUTTON, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF HEALTH
CARE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE (2007).
163

The trade unions later changed their opinions after realizing that workers were able to
exert influence in managing the sickness funds. Stefan Gress et al., The Social Transformation
of American Medicine: A Comparative View from Germany, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
679, 686 (2004).
164

See Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 131, at 12.

165

See Dixon et al., supra note 131, at 179.
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might be limited due to the protection of individuals’ liberty.166 In the Netherlands in
2006, health care reform, which made health insurance compulsory for the entire
population,167 was also criticized for limiting the freedom of choice both within the
health care market and within insurance markets.168 This struggle shows the
endeavor to balance individual liberty and social welfare. On the one hand, social
health insurance departed from liberalism by expanding the role of the state and
demanding compulsory contributions.169 On the other hand, it also departed from
paternalism by obligating the state to prove that restricted individual liberties are not
out of proportion to the benefits received under the mandatory duties imposed by
such a scheme.
In the U.S., several states (such as Virginia, Arizona, and Missouri) have
proposed variations of a Health Care Freedom Act, in which the right not to be
forced or coerced into joining a government-approved health care program is
regarded as a basic right of medical autonomy.170 State legislation in the U.S. shows
a high interest in protecting individual choice in coverage and service under health
care insurance plans. This interest is a continuing balancing act between providing
services for the truly needy with the American desire for a lightly governed health care
delivery system.171

166

See Dixon et al., supra note 131, at 179.

167

Before 2006, in the Netherlands, those with an income above certain amount (e.g.,
€31,750 in 2003) are excluded from the social insurance scheme. In other words, The Dutch
health care system consisted in two different forms of insurance (two tier scheme):
compulsory insurance for those with an income level under a certain level of income and
voluntary insurance for those earning more than this ceiling. However, after the Health Care
Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) entered into force in 2006, all persons residing in the
Netherlands are required by law to be insured under the National Insurance Schemes. See
Dixon et al., supra note 131, at 179; See Muiser, supra note 131, at 9.
168

But Romke Van der Veen also argued “these limitations are necessary in order to
maintain solidarity in health care insurance and provisions and in order to create cost-control.”
Romke van der Veen, supra note 131, at 5.
169

Paul Starr then argued that the development of social health presents an extension of
obligations as well as freedom because it constitutes an extension to social welfare on liberal
principle of civil and political rights. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST
INDUSTRY 238 (1982).
170

Id. For example, House Bill 10 of the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act states that,
“No law shall restrict a person's natural right and power of contract to secure the blessings of
liberty to choose private health care systems or private plans. No law shall interfere with the
right of a person or entity to pay for lawful medical services to preserve life or health, nor
shall any law impose a penalty, tax, fee, or fine, of any type, to decline or to contract for
health care coverage or to participate in any particular health care system or plan, except as
required by a court where an individual or entity is a named party in a judicial dispute.
Nothing herein shall be construed to expand, limit or otherwise modify any determination of
law regarding what constitutes lawful medical services within the Commonwealth.” 2010 Va.
Acts. H.B. 10.
171

See Weissert, supra note 149, at 66.
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VI. STEP 2: CLARIFY THE POLICY PURPOSES OF THE COMPULSORY NHI
It is important to identify health care policy purposes because health care policy
requires different means to achieve various purposes and some means impact human
rights. There are two reasons for this. First, clearly articulated goals for health care
policies can help “to identify the true purposes of the intervention, to facilitate public
understanding and debate about legitimate purposes, and to reveal prejudice (or prejustice), stereotypical attitudes, or irrational fear.”172 Without a clear policy purpose,
it is difficult to explicitly identify what policy instruments influence human rights,
and to evaluate whether the means to execute certain policies are adequate to achieve
their purpose.173 Second, in addition to addressing a clear purpose, in this step the
state also needs to prove that the means used by a coercive health care policy are
reasonably likely to achieve the proposed purpose, and that there is an adequate and
direct connection between the state’s actions and the policy’s purposes.174 In other
words, the existence of a valid compelling purpose alone cannot justify a health care
policy because the real issue here is not “what the state does” but “whether the health
care policy adequately leads to an effective outcome.”
In assessing the human rights impacts of Taiwan’s compulsory NHI, policy
purposes should be clearly evaluated because they can help identify the true
purposes and inform the debate about legitimate health care purposes.175 According
to Taiwan’s Department of Health176 and Council of Grand Justices,177 Taiwan’s NHI
adopts an individual mandate as an instrument to achieve multiple goals:178 (1)
increasing the participation rate and enrollees to increase the financial resources of
the NHI; and (2) preventing negative effects caused by adverse selection (also
termed “reverse selection” or “enrollee bias”).179 The needs for invasive interventions

172

Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 61.

173

Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 61.

174

This principle has been generally applied based on First Amendment protections in U.S.
Constitution. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., for example, the Fourth Circuit argued that
if a publication could be found to have no other use than to facilitate unlawful conduct, the
speech creating a significant societal harm is enough to give rise to a compelling
governmental interest in proscribing such speech. Rice v. Paladin Enters, Inc., 128 F.3d 233,
247 (4th Cir. 1997).
175

See Gostin & Mann, supra note 45, at 61.

176

See The LEGISLATIVE YUAN, THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE: NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE ACT 11.1 (The Legislative Yuan Secretariat ed., 1994) (Taiwan).
177
Taiwan’s Grand Justice Council argued that the constitutional purposes of the NHI are
providing mutual social support, advancing risk-sharing, and promoting public interests.
Const. Ct. Interp. No. 472, The Republic of China Constitutional Court (Grand Justices
Council) Reporter, Shizi (Judicial Yuan Interpretation) No. 472 (January 29, 1999) (Taiwan),
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=472.
178

THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE: NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ACT 2 (The
Legislative Yuan Secretariat ed., 1994).
179

See generally THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE: NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ACT
11.1 (The Legislative Yuan Secretariat ed., 1994) (mandating the types of groups who must
enroll in healthcare).
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imposed by the NHI on individual autonomy are then assessed differently for different
public health purposes in this section.180
The NHI’s individual mandate is reasonably likely to achieve the first policy
purpose—increasing the participation rate—because requiring all citizens to
subscribe the NHI creates a single, national pool and broadens the revenue base,
thereby providing comprehensive coverage for all Taiwanese people.181 Different
countries’ experiences (such as Taiwan, Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, U.K.,
and Canada)182 also show that the compulsory health care system did improve actual
population coverage,183 establish a self-financing mechanism,184 and significantly
lowered financial barriers that prevent the poor from receiving health care.185
The second policy purpose of the NHI’s individual mandate is to prevent adverse
selection, which is “a phenomenon that occurs within a mix of covered lives for a
plan, when patients with high health care utilization habits select a particular plan, in
greater numbers than are otherwise representative of the population as a whole.”186
The individual mandate achieves this end by prohibiting the exclusion of people
from coverage because of preexisting conditions or anticipated health risks.187
Because social health insurance systems are required to cover individuals and their
180

Id.

181

Daniels also argued that health care institutions must provide appropriate, effective
services to everyone in order to protect equality of opportunity. Norman Daniels et al.,
Fairness and National Health Care Reform, HEALTH CARE REFORM: ETHICS AND POLITICS 245
(Timothy H. Engström & Wade L. Robison eds., 2006). In other words, excluding certain
groups from coverage and leaving significant gaps in insurance coverage would violate the
basic principle of the universal coverage.
182

See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
REFORM OF HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN OECD COUNTRIES (1993);
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE REFORM OF HEALTH
CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVENTEEN OECD COUNTRIES (1994).
183

For example, before 1995 about 57% of the population in Taiwan was insured through
three separate programs. Likwang Chen et al., The Effects of Taiwan’s National Health
Insurance on Access and Health Status of the Elderly, 16(3) HEALTH ECON. 223, 223-24
(2007). By the end of 1995, when the NHI was launched, 97% of the population had enrolled
in the NHI, and the coverage rate has reached almost 99% in 1997 and has remained at that
level ever since. Id. In Netherlands, even though the population coverage (the proportion of
the population that is financially protected by a certain health financing scheme) before health
care reform in 2006 was already practically universal, the new model still attempts to achieve
true universal coverage by requiring all citizens to register for an insurance fund at the
sanction of a fine worth 130% of the premium. Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.
184
AVIVA RON ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOCIAL SECURITY
APPROACH 25 (1990); Muiser, supra note 131, at 16.
185

PAT ARMSTRONG ET AL, UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN
LEARN FROM THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 62 (1998); Muiser, supra note 131, at 16; ShouHsia
Cheng, The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Health Care Utilization in Taiwan,
278(2) JAMA 89, 89 (1997).
186
187

RICHARD ROGNEHAUGH, THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE DICTIONARY 7 (1998).

Mario Loyola, Anti-Obamacare Brief, Explained, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan. 6,
2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/287435/anti-obamacare-brief-explained-marioloyola.
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pre-existing health conditions, nothing prevents a healthy individual from forgoing
purchasing insurance until he or she is sick.188 But studies showed that people would
not likely enroll in health insurance unless they expected illness or an accident in the
near future or they were already sick or disabled.189 Therefore, without a mandate to
purchase health insurance, healthy individuals would leave the health insurance to
only the costliest individuals (who are mainly the sick and the old).190 Adverse
selection would then lead to severe financial hardships for the social health insurance
scheme191 because it would be covering only those sick or high-risk individuals.192
In addition, adverse selection also undermines the whole point of social health
insurance, which is to protect people by sharing risks as widely as possible.193
Private health insurers tend to target healthy individuals and to exclude those who
face abnormally high risks due to their poor health behaviors (e.g., lung cancer
caused by smoking).194 Therefore, without a compulsory mechanism, high risk and
sick individuals and groups would be “unproportionately” distributed between social
health insurance and private health insurance. Thus, disadvantaged minority groups
(e.g., the poor and the sick) would comprise the majority of social health insurance
subscribers,195 and social health insurance would end up with large expenses and be
unfairly placed at a competitive disadvantage. The disadvantaged then might be
denied coverage or given reduced coverage with higher premiums because of the
expected costs of health care services.196 Furthermore, in a vicious spiral, more and
more healthy people would withdraw from social health insurance due to the excess

188

Id.

189

R. L. Archer, Adverse Selection in the Health Care Financing System, 79(6) BESTS REV.
LIFE HEALTH. INSUR. ED. 10 (1978); K. Drummer, Controlling Adverse Selection, 2(1)
HEALTH COST MANAGE 1 (1985).
190
Citizens might not want to buy any health insurance or might choose to join private
health insurance with a lower premium (but with less medical coverage) when they are
healthy. But, citizens who are seriously sick, or at an advanced age when they would more
like face serious illnesses, would be more willing to join social health insurance because
private insurance would charge extremely high premiums due to their conditions or advanced
age.
191

See Gottlieb, supra note 150, at 543. Gottlieb also argues that in the U.S. the proposals
for health care reform are insufficient to reach the goal of universal coverage because they fail
to prevent adverse selection. Gottlieb, supra note 150, at 543.
192

See Gottlieb, supra note 150, at 546.

193

See Daniels et al., supra note 181, at 246.

194

It must be noted that adverse selection is not limited to patients or purchasers because
“insurers can also engage in adverse selection by marketing insurance to individuals less
likely to need medical services than average or by excluding high risk individuals and
groups.” Marc A. Rodwin, The Metamorphosis of Managed Care: Implications for Health
Reform Internationally, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 654 n.13 (2010).
195

James Cardon & Mark Showalter, Insurance Choice and Tax-Preferred Health Savings
Accounts, 26(2) J. HEALTH ECON. 373, 389 (2007).
196

See Daniels et al., supra note 181, at 246; Richard A. Garcia, Equity for All? Potential
Impact of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Act of 2008, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 137, 149
(2010).
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financial burden, and this would further worsen the financial viability of social
health insurance.197
The formula for determining social health insurance premiums (see infra, Table
1198) can help clarify whether a compulsory health insurance scheme could prevent
(or reduce) the negative effects caused by adverse selection.199 In this formula, the
social health insurance premium rate (PA) is calculated and set in accordance with
the average disease risk (RA). In the first case, if an individual has a lower disease
risk (RL), he or she would have a lower premium rate (PL). Since the social health
insurance premium (PA) is determined by an average disease risk (RA) and RA > RL,
the individual using public health care insurance is required to pay a higher premium
PA (a fixed average insurance premium rate) instead of PL. Thus, if the compulsory
health insurance scheme is unregulated, and citizens are allowed to freely withdraw
from the insurance at any time, healthier citizens would likely not enroll in social
health insurance because they would need to pay relatively high premiums.200 In the
second case, for an individual with a higher risk of disease (RH), the premium rate
(PH) would be high in relation to RH. Because RA < RH, the social health insurance
premium (PA) is lower than PH. Consequently, citizens with a higher disease risk
would likely enroll in social health insurance because they only need to pay a
relatively low premium.201
Table 1. Formula for Setting Health Insurance Premiums202
RA ＝ βRH＋（1－β）RL
RA: average disease risk
RH: high disease risk
RL: low disease risk
(RH > RA > RL)
β: percentage of people with high disease risk in population
Therefore, social health insurance plans would be greatly weakened by adverse
selection if they allow recipients unlimited disenrollment freedom after the program
is enacted.203 The compulsory health insurance scheme then becomes an appropriate
and valid solution to avoid negative effects of adverse selection because it can help
healthcare authorities successfully adjust the diversified risks of diseases (and the
corresponding premium rates). It is also likely to reduce selection bias.
In conclusion, increasing the participation rate, maintaining financial efficiency,
and preventing adverse selection are clear and achievable policy purposes of
Taiwan’s compulsory NHI. Thus, it would be difficult to challenge their
constitutionality.
197

See Loyola, supra note 187.

198

GI-RUI XIE, HEALTH ECONOMICS 221 (1996).

199

Id.

200

See Loyola, supra note 187.

201

See GI-RUI XIE, supra note 198.

202

See GI-RUI XIE, supra note 198.

203

Charles Tiefer & Heather Akehurst-Krause, Risky Business: Medicare's Vulnerability to
Selection Games of Managed Care Providers, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 319, 325-26 (1999).

2013]

CAN COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE BE JUSTIFIED?

83

VII. STEP 3: EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMPULSORY NHI
If a health care policy is proven to be “reasonably” able and “likely” to achieve
its proposed purposes, the state should then compare the policy with other
alternatives. If other policy instruments would burden basic rights and liberties to a
lesser extent while still providing a likelihood of achieving the proposed purposes, a
coercive health care policy would be unjustified. It would be unjustified because it
fails to adopt the least restrictive alternative to achieving the same purpose.204 Given
this standard (step 3) and the evaluation of the effectiveness (step 2), the state would
not be permitted to resort to restrictions on individual liberty if it could achieve the
proposed purpose through less drastic and coercive means.
Therefore, after proving that the compulsory NHI can reasonably and likely
achieve its proposed purposes, the state then has the burden to prove such a coercive
program is the least restrictive alternative that burdens individual liberty to a lesser
extent, while still having a likelihood of achieving its proposed purpose. More
specifically, society should question whether requiring all citizens rather than only
some, or a substantial portion thereof, to participate in one particular social health
insurance plan is the least restrictive policy. However, the reality in Taiwan has been
that the executive, the legislature, and the courts have never carefully evaluated the
degree of invasiveness implicit in the NHI’s individual mandate.
Although studies have shown that a compulsory health insurance scheme is a
decent policy instrument205 that effectively prevents adverse selection in social health
care programs,206 minimizes the cost of health care services,207 and reduces entry
barriers to receiving health care;208 the NHI’s requirement that all citizens participate
in the plan is not the least restrictive alternative to achieve these policy objectives.
Health economic studies209 and experiences of some countries (including Germany
204
In United States, the “least restrictive means test” reflects the spirit of this principle. The
court in Lake v. Cameron held that mentally ill patients should not be subject to deprivations
of liberty beyond what is necessary to protect them, and that the court should be authorized to
consider and evaluate the alternatives to hospitalization of patients with mental illness because
“alternative courses of treatment or care should be fashioned as the interests of the person and
of the public required” in each particular case. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
205

See infra Parts VII & VIII. Regarding the objectives of compulsory health insurance,
there are other alternatives that can achieve the same objectives. For example, the state can
offer incentives such as reducing employment taxes or providing financial subsidies to
encourage, instead of force, the young and the healthy to enroll in the public health insurance.
But these alternatives not only influence other basic liberties (such as property rights) but also
fail to efficiently achieve the policy purposes as the compulsory health insurance scheme
does, because citizens with lower disease risks still have a great chance to refuse to enroll in
public health care programs.
206

ZHI-LIANG YANG, HEALTH INSURANCE 11 (1996); MU-XING KE, SOCIAL INSURANCE 6061 (1994); GAO-GIAO XIE, THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 147-52
(1990).
207

MARK PAULY ET AL., RESPONSIBLE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 3-4 (1992).

208

PAUL FELDSTEIN, HEALTH POLICY ISSUES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 267-70 (3d ed.
2003).
209

ZHI-LIANG YANG, HEALTH INSURANCE 11-13 (1996); GI-RUI XIE, HEALTH ECONOMICS
222-23 (1996).
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and the Netherlands) show that a high participation rate suffices to create a large
scale market sufficient to include both healthy and unhealthy people and to
circumvent adverse selection.210 Therefore, compared to Taiwan’s universal
compulsory NHI, a health plan with an opt-out system for a minority of citizens could
be a less restrictive alternative for Taiwan if it restricted individual liberty less but still
had a predetermined large number of participants.
The opt-out system no doubt has its own problems,211 and the Netherlands
eventually adopted an individual mandate requiring individuals to purchase health
insurance. However, studies have shown that these problems can be diminished
through proper regulations (such as “must-cover” legislation212 and the ban on risk
selection213) instead of a compulsory individual mandate for “all” citizens. In other
words, with proper regulations the opt-out system may still be able to achieve
compelling policy purposes while burdening individual liberties to a lesser extent.
For example, Germany’s public compulsory health care plan does not require all
citizens to participate.214 Instead, only laborers and workers215 whose salaries are under
a certain level (€48,150 per year in 2008)216 are compelled by law to enroll in the statesponsored health insurance. Citizens whose income is higher than a certain level are
allowed to opt out, and all civil servants and the self-employed are excluded from the
state’s mandatory health insurance.217 These excluded citizens have the freedom to
choose to enroll in either the state-sponsored health insurance or a private health
insurance plan.218 The state agrees to give the wealthy and the self-employed more
liberties because it is neither necessary nor urgent to provide health insurance for the
high-salary earners, who ostensibly have enough financial ability to pay for their own
medical care. On the contrary, the state assumes it should provide more health care to
210

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14

211

Martina Grunow & Robert Nuscheler, Public and Private Health Insurance in
Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem 2-3 (Institute for Economics, Universitaet
Augsburg, Discussion Paper No. 312, 2010), available at http://www.wiwi.uniaugsburg.de/vwl/institut/paper/312.pdf. For example, in Germany, due to risk selection
between public and private branches of health care financing, private patients are able to
escape income redistribution so that health care financing does not follow the ability-to-pay
principle. See Muiser, supra note 131, at 9; In Netherlands, the two-tier system (mandatory
and voluntary health insurance) before 2006 also sustained a level of inequity “due to
differences in the benefit packages of the mandatory and voluntary scheme.” Id.
212

See Gottlieb, supra note 150, at 545.

213

Judith D de Jong, Atie van den Brink-Muinen & Peter Groenewegen, The Dutch Health
Insurance Reform: Switching Between Insurers, a Comparison Between the General
Population and the Chronically Ill and Disabled, 8 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 58, 59
(2008).
214
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE REFORM OF
HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN OECD COUNTRIES 57-72 (1992).
215

See id. The insured includes (a) the employees whose monthly salary is lower than
certain amount, (b) the workers or members who belong to the occupational groups or unions,
and (3) the beneficiaries of the annuity. Id.
216

See Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 131, at 12.

217

See Dixon et al., supra note 131, at 179-80.

218

See Dixon et al., supra note 131, at 179-80.
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laborers because social risks, such as the spread of disease, impact low-wage earning
citizens. These social risks curtail salaries of low-wage earners and have far more
serious influences on the low wage-earner and the disadvantaged than on the
employers and the self-employed.219
Even though the German government does not require all citizens to participate
in its public health insurance, the participation rate in health insurance is still
significantly high to prevent (or adjust) adverse selection.220 In 1993, the
participation rate in Germany’s public health insurance was 88.5%.221 Only 73.5% of
the insured were compelled by law to subscribe to public health insurance, while
15% of the insured voluntarily enrolled in public health insurance.222 The rate has
remained high and fairly stable for decades; 72% and 74% are compulsorily insured,
14% and 14% are voluntarily insured with social insurance, and 9% and 14% had
private health insurance in 2001 and 2005.223 Therefore, even when the German
government requires only a substantial portion of citizens to enroll in public health
insurance, the participation rate is not substantially influenced. There is no adverse
selection because the healthy and the young are still willing to enroll in public health
insurance.
Figure 3. Germany’s Participation Rates in Health Care Plans (1993)
Uninsured: 0.13%

Other health insurances: 2.37%
Private health insurance (voluntary): 9.00%
Public health insurance (voluntary): 15.00%
Public health insurance (compulsory): 73.50%
15.00%

(% of total population)

219
For example, David Moss believed that the country’s salvation lay in creating a system
of protection for wage earners ― a security state. DAVID MOSS, SOCIALIZING SECURITY:
PROGRESSIVE-ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 4-6 (1996).
The American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) also argued that the state should
provide proper health care programs (in labor legislation) to protect workers from the worst
excesses of industrial capitalism. Id.; HOFFMAN, supra note 31.
220

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.

221

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 214,

at 58.
222
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 214, at
58; see infra Figure 3.
223

Markus Schneider, Structure and Experience of German Opt-Out System of Statutory
Health Insurance (GKV) 9 (World Bank Human Development Sector Unit, Working Paper,
2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/
Resources/German_Opt-Out_eng.pdf; George France, The Form and Context of Federalism:
Meanings for Health Care Financing, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y 649, 652 (2008).
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Similarly, the participation rate in social health insurance was high in the
Netherlands before the 2006 health care reform.224 This was true even when the state
required only some groups (e.g., the low wage-earner, the unemployed, and the
handicapped) to enroll in the state-sponsored health insurance program.225 More
specifically, the previous Dutch social health insurance system was divided into four
categories:226
(1) The exceptional medical expenses scheme, which paid for catastrophic
health care and required all citizens to enroll;227
(2) The sickness funds insurance,228 which required citizens whose annual
income was less than €32,600 (US $44,475 in 2003) and those receiving
social security service or remedies (the unemployed and the handicapped)
to participate. In 2003, these two groups comprised 63% of the
population;229
(3) The state-funded insurance for public servants, which required public
employees (3% of the population in 2003) to sign up for coverage that
included benefits similar to those provided by sickness funds;230 and
(4) Self-employed and employees earning over a certain income limit
could voluntarily buy the supplementary health insurance program
(private insurance).231
Excluding the exceptional medical expenses scheme, even though only 66%
(63% + 3%) of the population was required to enroll in Dutch social health insurance
plans;232 in 2003, the participation rate was 96% of the Dutch population.233 In terms
of actual coverage, the opt-out scheme left little room for improvement and was able
to achieve the proposed policy purposes (increasing the participation rate and
preventing adverse selection) of the compulsory NHI, without imposing broad and
profound restrictions on individual liberties.234
224

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.

225

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 214,
at 87-101.
226

JI-CYONG LUO, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 227-314 (2006).

227

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 214,
at 89-90. This scheme pays mainly for long-term care in nursing homes, in psychiatric
institutions and in general hospitals when the duration of stay exceeds 365 days.
228
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 214,
at 89-90. This is a compulsory health insurance administrated by numerous independent and
non-profit insurance funds.
229

JOAN C. LO, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: EXPERIENCES OF JAPAN, GERMAN, FRANCE
AND NETHERLANDS 235 (2006).
230

See id.

231

See id. In 2003, 5% of the population was buying private health insurance.

232

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14. The Dutch social health plan includes both public
health insurance and private health insurance, which has the same medical coverage with
public health insurance.
233

See Lo, supra note 229, at 234-35.

234

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.
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Even though the 2006 Dutch health care reform abandoned the opt-out system in
favor of the individual mandate for health insurance, increasing the participation rate
(as proposed by the NHI) is not the reason why the new Dutch health care model
requires all citizens to register for a health insurance.235 The health insurance
coverage in the Netherlands was already practically universal before the new model
was implemented.236 The new system’s policy objective aims to eliminate health
inequity caused by differences between the benefit packages offered under the
mandatory and voluntary health care schemes respectively,237 rather than to
maximize the participation rate or to increase financial resources.
This comparison amongst Taiwan’s, Germany’s, and the Netherlands’ national
health care programs reveals that Taiwan’s actual enrollment rate of 99.48% of the
population (in 2008),238 is slightly higher than the German and Dutch rates of
87.8%239 and 96%240 (in 2003). However, Taiwan requires 100% of its citizens to
enroll while Germany required 75% to do so in 2005 and the Netherlands just 67%
in 2003.241 Yet, since the actual German and Dutch enrollment rates were well above
80%, it is clear that requiring all citizens to register for social health insurance is not
the least restrictive alternative that may be employed to efficiently achieve a high
participation rate and to avoid the negative impacts of adverse selection. The
German and Dutch experiences show that, instead of all-inclusive compulsory health
insurance, there are different alternatives (e.g., the opt-out system) that achieve
compelling policy objectives. The state should be obligated to adopt the least
restrictive alternative, which is to require only certain segments of citizens to enroll
in compulsory social health insurance. Taiwan’s universal compulsory NHI, which
requires all citizens to register, is not the least restrictive alternative and is therefore
not justified in restricting an individual’s freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance.
VIII. STEP 4: ASSESS TRADE-OFF RELATIONSHIPS IN COMPULSORY NHI
(IMPORTANCE TEST)
In order to justify a coercive health care policy, in addition to evaluating its
adequacy (step 2) and effectiveness (step 3), the state also has the burden to prove
that the weight of restricted rights and liberties is not out of proportion with the
pursued public order (or social benefits).242 Assessing trade-off relationships in
235

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 10-11.

236

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.
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See Muiser, supra note 131, at 9; Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau et al., An Experiment
with Regulated Competition and Individual Mandates for Universal Health Care: The New
Dutch Health Insurance System, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1031, 1033 (2008).
238

The National Health Insurance Statistics, 2008, BUREAU OF NAT’L HEALTH INS. (August
1, 2008), http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=296&
webdata_id=3109.
239

See Dixon et al., supra note 131.

240

See Lo, supra note 229, at 234-35.

241

See Muiser, supra note 131, at 14.

242

United States courts also emphasize that societal harm manifests itself in its assessment
of the magnitude of governmental interest; thus, the greater the harm, the stronger the interest.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
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health care policy is important243 because this assessment provides a procedural and
substantive standard to determine whether the state has retained considerable
discretion when pursuing its health care policy purposes.244 Taiwan’s Constitution
also requires that any trade-off between restricted freedoms and pursued public
benefits in a coercive policy should be assessed. This requirement is derived from
Article 23 of the Constitution which states: “[a]ll the freedoms and rights
enumerated in the preceding articles shall not be abridged by law except such as may
be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of others, to avert an
imminent danger, to maintain social, order or to advance public welfare.”245
A. The Importance Test
In order to assess the trade-off in the NHI’s compulsory health insurance scheme,
I propose to apply the “importance test” on the basis of Rawls’ analytical approach
in his political conception of justice246 and to outline the scope of invasiveness and
the burden the NHI imposes on human rights. The “importance test” emphasizes that
the burden on a liberty (e.g., individual autonomy) imposed by a coercive health care
policy (e.g., compulsory health insurance) is unjustified if the burden restricts the
central application range (the exercise of moral powers) of that liberty.
According to Rawls’ moral powers approach,247 full and informed exercise of
moral powers (capacities for the conception of the good and the sense of justice)248 is
crucial for the protection of basic liberty in a coercive (health care) system. The
(1961)) For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sherbert held that “if [the] purpose or effect
of a law is to impede observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect.” Id. at 404. In another case the Supreme Court noted that
“[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the
State to prevent or punish is obvious.” Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940).
243
For example, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
limitations of human rights must be “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 29, ¶ 2, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
244
In order to make an individual determination of a proper trade-off relationship, Gostin
and Mann propose to apply the “significant risk standard” in the human rights impact
assessment for public health policies, which permits coercive measures only to avert likely
harm (a significant risk) to the health or safety of the society. Gostin & Mann, supra note 45,
at 75
245
MINGUO XIANFA art. 23, (1946) (Taiwan), available at http://www.taiwandocuments.
org/constitution01.htm#C003.
246

Rawls also proposed two fundamental cases, which are connected with capacities for
the conception of the good and the sense of justice (moral powers), as a criterion to identify
truly essential liberties and to assign them priority. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 45, 112-13.
247

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 18-19, 196; RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 19, 81,

108.
248

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 18-19.
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exercise of these powers is crucial because without them rational deliberators can
neither become engaged in social cooperation nor be free and equal members of
society.249 In order to address this issue, this section briefly reviews Rawls’
responses to the questions of (1) whether the list of basic liberties is flexible enough
to adjust and expand, and (2) how to assess the significance of a particular liberty.250
Rawls agrees that simply offering a broad and imprecise list of basic liberties cannot
answer the difficult question of which liberties are basic. This list might conflict with
the viewpoints of the rational-representative deliberators in the original position,251
and might not sufficiently satisfy their rational interests.252 Thus, Rawls proposed a
criterion to assess the significance of basic liberties on the basis of “the central range
of application.”253 The central range of application states that basic liberties are those
liberties providing essential political and social conditions (institutional protections)
for the adequate development and full exercise of an equal and free person’s moral
powers.254 This argument stems from the need to protect individuals’ ability to
develop and to realize the final ends that they value in their worthwhile life plans:
(1) Because rational deliberators behind the veil of ignorance cannot
know whether their views about final ends would put them in the majority
or minority, they likely would not leave it to others to decide the final
ends for them. They would like to maintain “the capacity for the
conception of the good”255 to make decisions and to regard the basic
liberty, which is necessary to allow individuals to exercise this capacity,
as non-negotiable so they can follow their own moral, religious, and
philosophical values.256
(2) In addition, even if a social institution were publicly known to satisfy
justice principles and to advance citizens’ conceptions of the good, the
absence of an effective public sense of justice would still make this social
249

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 111, 169-70.

250

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 168-69.

251

John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 46 (April 10, 1981), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/ documents/
rawls82.pdf. Rawls admitted that there are two different and conflicting criteria to determine
the basic liberties in a theory of justice. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 112. One is to specify those
liberties so as to achieve the most extensive scheme of the liberties; while another takes up the
point of view of the rational representative equal citizen, and then to specify the scheme of
liberties in the light of that citizen’s rational interests. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 112. But the
idea of the extent of a basic liberty is useful only in the least important cases, and citizens’
rational interests are not sufficiently explained. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 112.
252

See H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority, READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES
Daniels ed., 1989).

ON RAWLS’ “A THEORY OF JUSTICE” 233-39 (Norman
253

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 111.

254

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 112-13.

255

The capacity for a conception of the good means the ability to have, to receive, and to
rationally pursue a conception of good. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 19. And the conception of
the good is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of
what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life.
RAWLS, supra note 94, at 19.
256

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 311.
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institution unstable.257 Therefore, when sketching basic liberties and
assigning them priority, rational deliberators prefer to take “the capacity
for the sense of justice”258 into consideration in order to ascertain whether
citizens will act upon the principles agreed to with the effectiveness and
regularity of which human nature is capable.259
Therefore, a rational deliberator would oppose the imposition of legal and other
restrictions on a liberty if such a restriction would influence the full and informed
exercise of capacities for the conception of the good and/or the sense of justice. The
rational deliberator would oppose such restrictions because he or she needs these
moral powers to develop his or her own conception of the good and to equally
negotiate distributive justice principles irrespective of income, social status, political
allegiance, or other arbitrary factors. Since the lesser or greater significance of a
liberty depends upon “whether it is more or less essentially involved in. . . the full
and informed exercise” of two moral powers,260 these moral powers should be
carefully observed and tracked when evaluating the trade-off between restricted
liberties and pursued public order in a coercive health care policy. Therefore, if the
central application range of a basic liberty is not secured in a coercive health care
policy, the priority of the liberty is infringed and the liberty is “restricted” rather than
“regulated.”261
B. The Importance Test Revisited
Basic liberties are not absolute. In accordance with Rawls’ priority principle,
basic liberties (which are closely related to the exercise of moral powers) should be
given priority over other social benefits and cannot be sacrificed for the sake of economic or
social benefits. However, according to Rawls, they may still be limited for the sake of

257

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 315-16. According to Rawls, it is a great
advantage to everyone’s conception of the good if the public acknowledges that everyone has
an effective sense of justice and can be relied upon as a fully cooperating member of society.
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 315.
258
The capacity for a sense of justice means the ability to understand, to apply, and to act
based on the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.
RAWLS, supra note 94, at 18-19.
259

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 316.

260

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 113.

261

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 296. According to Rawls, in adjusting basic
liberties, “regulation” can be distinguished from “restriction”: regulations are those that do not
restrict the central application range while restrictions do. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 109.
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liberty262 in order to be combined into one coherent scheme of liberties.263 Rawls’ liberty and
priority principles read as follows:264
(1) Liberty principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all.265
(2) Priority principle: The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical
order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.
There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total
system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty must be
acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty.266
Rawls’ priority principle then can provide an abstract, yet idealized, analytical
way to determine the proper balanced trade-off relationship between restricted
liberties and pursued public order in a coercive health care policy.267 The statement
262

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note at 92, at 216-219. For example, a freedom such as the
religious liberty of an intolerant religious sect could be restricted only when the public has
sincere reason to believe that the institution of basic liberty (such as liberty of conscience or
religious liberty), or the security of such liberty, are in danger. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note
92, at 217-218. In other words, limiting the freedom of an intolerant sect (banning their
intolerant beliefs) is justified, not because of greater social gains but because of the protection
of everyone’s equal liberties. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note at 92, at 217-218.
263

RAWLS, supra note 94, at 104.

264

See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 250; RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 94, at 29499, 310-24; RAWLS, supra note 94, at 104-106.
265

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 250.

266

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 250.

267

Because I apply Rawls’ priority principle to evaluate the restricted liberty in the
coercive health care policy, it is necessary to briefly respond to the major objections to Rawls’
original theory in 1971. The first objection to the priority of basic liberty, originally voiced by
Hart, can be formulated by charging Rawls with an incomplete conception of fundamental
liberty or an overblown view of its importance. Hart, supra note 252, at 237-39, 50-51.
Second, Hart also argued that Rawls’ priority principle is plausible only in simple and less
controversial cases, in which basic liberties obviously contribute more than other liberties.
Hart, supra note 252, at 238. Third, there is no clear reason why a surrender of liberties, which
people may desire purely for a large increase in material welfare (such as economic interests
or social benefits), should be forbidden by the priority rule. Hart, supra note 252, at 237.
However, Rawls has taken Hart’s viewpoint into consideration (as revealed in Rawls’ later
revised liberty principle) and answered Hart’s critics by applying moral powers to evaluate the
central application range of basic liberties. According to Rawls, no priority should be assigned
to any liberty on the basis of a preeminent value. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 29697; RAWLS, supra note 94, at 44-45, 111-14. The priority of basic liberties should be debated
and established via the analytical perspective, meaning liberties should be considered
fundamental when and only when they provide the essential political and social conditions
(the central application range) for a free and equal person to fully exercise the basic capacities
(moral powers) to form, revise, and pursue the sense of justice and the conception of the good.
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 296-97. Furthermore, according to this analytical
approach, the revised priority principle is able to distinguish marginal from substantial
influences on basic liberties. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 44-45. In addition, Amartya Sen also
argued that it is unreasonable to give “absolute priority” to basic liberties over all the other
socio-economic needs. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 64 (2000). Rawls basically

92

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:51

of the importance test discussed in an earlier section can be further modified and
extended. They should now read:
(1) The burden on a liberty (e.g., individual autonomy) imposed by a
coercive health care policy (e.g., compulsory health insurance) is
unjustified if the burden significantly restricts the central application
range of that liberty, unless the public order that the policy intends to
pursue relates to the protection or improvement of liberties rather than to
economic or social well-being (the priority rule).268
(2) On the contrary, if the coercive health care policy has no significant
impact on the exercise of moral powers, to justify the burden on human
rights the state merely needs to prove that there is public order concerns
involving either the protection of liberty or the pursuit of economic or
social gains, for the policy to be pursued (the public interest rule).
There are two constituent elements in the revised important test: moral powers
and lexical order (comparative importance) of liberties. More specifically, in the first
case (the priority rule), in order to protect the inviolability of basic liberties, which
are related to the exercise of moral powers, merely the pursuit of economic or social
benefits would not be sufficient to justify a coercive policy. In that case the policy
would not be justified unless the state can prove that such a restriction is necessary
for the defense of a liberty itself or the best total system of liberty.269 On the one
hand, a free and equal rational deliberator in the original position would agree to
give priority to preserving basic liberties because sacrificing basic liberties for the
sake of material benefits might render the deliberator unable to apply practical
reason and judgment to develop his or her own conception of the good.270 On the
agreed with Sen’s criticism and proposed that the realization of rational deliberators’
fundamental interests (protection of moral powers) needs more than the protection of basic
liberties. It also necessitates “certain social conditions and a degree of fulfillment of needs and
material [benefits].” RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 132. In other words, when failing to
fulfill certain socio-economic needs would obstruct the full establishment of basic liberties,
equal liberties can be denied in order to “change the quality of civilization so that in due
course everyone can enjoy these freedoms.” ROBERT S. TAYLOR, RESTRUCTURING RAWLS: THE
KANTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 168 (2011).
268

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 295-96.

269

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 232, 239. In other words, society needs to evaluate
justifications for restricting liberty by exploring whether the less extensive freedom is or is not
sufficiently outweighed by the greater security and extent of other liberties.
270

Rawls proposed that the priority of the basic liberty principle is more effective than the
principle of average utility in guaranteeing equal basic liberties in meeting three essential
requirements for a stable constitutional regime. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 115. The first
requirement, given the fact of pluralism, is to fix the basic liberties and to assign them a
special priority. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 115. The fulfillment of such a requirement would
put the political agenda beyond the calculus of social interests, thus securing clearly and
firmly the terms of social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect. RAWLS, supra note 94, at
115. The second requirement is that its political conception should specify not only shared but
if possible, a clear basis of public reason, and one that can publicly be seen to be sufficiently
reliable in its own terms. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 116. The priority principle (and the liberty
principle) would satisfy this requirement by providing independent and precedent status of the
basic liberties in the theory of justice.
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other hand, if a fully adequate system of liberty for all (which guarantees rational
individuals’ full exercise of moral powers and enjoyments of liberties) is in danger,
rational deliberators would agree to forgo part of their liberties (and sacrifice part of
their moral powers) to transform a less fair society into one in which all liberties can
be fully enjoyed.271
In the second case (the public interest rule), the trade-off would be evaluated less
strictly because restricted liberties are not directly related to moral powers. The state
merely has the burden to prove that there is a compelling interest, in either the
protection of liberty or of the pursuit of economic or social gains that is substantially
furthered by restricting liberties.
Based upon the proposed distinctive justifications as a criterion in the revised
importance test, the trade-off between the restricted liberty and the pursued social
benefits in the compulsory NHI case then can be identified and evaluated. One
possible objection to this importance test is that the value and the priority of liberty
should not be the ultimate determinant in matters of health care programs.272 For
example, H.L.A. Hart argued that if there are still people who may desire purely for
a large increase in material benefits and would be willing to surrender some liberties
to get them, there is no clear reason why a surrender of liberties should be forbidden
by the priority rule.273
My short response to this objection is based upon the protection of moral powers.
Generally speaking, allowing an individual to choose between liberties and material
welfare is established on the premise that the individual should have basic
capabilities to: (1) decide what material benefits he or she wants to pursue; (2) to
rationally evaluate the trade-off between restricted liberties and pursued benefits;
and (3) to decide whether he or she want to trade liberties for benefits. Therefore, if
the compulsory NHI would cripple individuals’ full and informed exercises of moral
powers (e.g. forcing individuals to trade liberties for benefits), this premise would
also be rejected. It is then unreasonable for rational individuals to abandon the
priority of the liberty and concur with the justifiability of this coercive health care
policy. In this case, in order to prevent the state from coercively restricting the
exercise of moral powers, individuals would agree with the priority rule. On the
contrary, if individuals’ moral powers are preserved and the central application range
is not restricted, it would be justified and acceptable to trade liberties for economic
and social benefits (if rational deliberators approve), as proposed by the public
interest rule.
C. The Importance for the Individual Mandate without Insurance Package Option
(Taiwan’s Case)
According to the importance test, whether the compulsory health insurance is
justified depends upon (1) whether it restricts the central application range (the
exercise of moral powers) of individual liberty, and (2) whether there exists a proper,
balanced trade-off between restricted liberty and pursued public order.274 The
271

RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 92, at 217.

272

Hart, supra note 252, at 250.

273

Id. at 250-51.

274

See generally James W. Nickel, Rethinking Rawls’s Theory of Liberty and Rights, 69
CHI.-KENT L REV. 763, 772-779 (1993).
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delineation of a proper trade-off is decided based upon the priority rule or the public
interest rule:
(1) If the compulsory health insurance would substantially restrict the
central application range and individuals’ exercise of moral powers (e.g.,
citizens only have one single choice assigned by the state), according to
Rawls’ priority rule, the compulsoriness is an impermissible and
unjustifiable restriction unless the state can prove that such a restriction is
necessary for the defense of a liberty itself or the best total system of
liberty, rather than for economic or social well-being.
(2) If the compulsory health insurance has no significant impact on the
central applications range (e.g., individuals can still choose between
different health care plans in a free health care market), according to the
public interest rule, this coercive health care policy is a justified
regulation of individual liberty when the state can prove that there is
public order, either of the protection of liberty or of pursuit of economic
or social gains, for the policy to pursue.
For the argument’s sake, I carefully distinguish the human rights burdens on
individual liberty imposed by the compulsory health insurance into two different but
equally important cases – (1) a compulsory health insurance scheme with a universal
standardized medical coverage (Taiwan’s universal compulsory NHI), and (2) a
compulsory health insurance scheme with a number of options in terms of insurance
packages (America’s Health Care Reform).275 These cases are distinguished because
interactions between two policy instruments - the individual mandate for health
insurance and the single payer system - are complicated and would affect the results
of the importance test.276 Firstly, this Article will examine Taiwan’s universal
compulsory NHI based upon the importance test.
1. The Compulsory NHI’s Impacts on Moral Powers
In the first case, the central application range of the freedom to purchase or
decline health insurance is restricted because the compulsory NHI, which adopts a
single-payer system with a universal standardized medical coverage, would prevent
individuals from pursuing their own and incommensurable conceptions of the good
in health care.277
As discussed earlier in Section II(A), the compulsory NHI’s single-payer
program is a type of financing system in which one governmental entity, the Bureau
of National Health Insurance (BNHI), acts as an administrator to collect all health
care fees, to pay for all health care costs, and to set up the universal standardized
275

See supra Part VII(D).

276

For example, compare the following two cases: (1) Government A requires all citizens
to enroll in a national health insurance (a compulsory health care program) that covers only
certain services designed by health care authorities (a universal standardized medical
coverage); and (2) Government B also requires all citizens to enroll in a national health
insurance, but allows citizens to negotiate with health insurers and choose between different
medical coverage. It is obvious that the human rights burden on the disenrollment freedom in
the first case is much greater than in the second case. I will discuss more about the difference
between these two cases in this section and the sections following.
277

See supra Part I.
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medical coverage and payment rules.278 Because the Taiwanese Ministry of Finance
forbids private insurance companies to provide any health insurance coverage
similar to the NHI’s medical coverage,279 citizens, without another choice, are
practically forced to buy the NHI’s universal standardized medical coverage.280
Therefore, the Taiwanese government basically monopolizes the health insurance
business and arbitrarily decides what diseases and medical treatments are paid by the
public health insurance.
Under this compulsory NHI’s single-payer system, individuals with
incommensurable conceptions of the good about what kinds of integrated bodily
functions they prefer to obtain or to regain are forced to accept the universal
standardized medical coverage determined by the BNHI.281 More specifically, under
the NHI’s single-payer system, whether or not a medical intervention is included in
the NHI’s medical coverage is decided by the BNHI on the basis of a shared
common basis to distribute health care without respecting individuals’ moral,
religious, and philosophical values. Thus, rational deliberators with different values
are forced to give up the liberty of making autonomous choices regarding health care
benefit packages (non-clinical decisions), which are value-laden (on the basis of
one’s perceived final ends) and are strongly related to their own conceptions of the
good. For example, different medical treatments for disease D1 (e.g., terminal
cancer) provide different types of goodness ― treatment X1 (e.g., the radiology
therapy) can prolong a patient’s life but also cause serious side effects, while
treatment Y1 (e.g., the palliative care) can enhance a patient’s quality of life but
cannot extend his or her life. Given the patient’s circumstances and life plan,
different patients will value the goodness provided by different medical treatments
differently. However, if the BNHI arbitrarily decides to provide medical coverage
including only treatment X1 rather than treatment Y1 for terminal cancer, individuals
who prefer treatment Y1 can only accept that decision.282
On the one hand, due to the NHI’s single payer system, individuals with different
conceptions of the good have no freedom to decide the contents of the NHI’s
medical coverage.283 On the other hand, due to the NHI’s individual mandate,
individuals are forced to accept this coercive NHI’s medical coverage, which they
might disagree with.284 The dual restrictions then drastically confine individuals’
capacities to pursue their own conceptions of the good through health care, and
278

Cheng, supra note 15, at 67.

279

Tai-Cai-Bao-Zi No. 840123987 (The Ministry of Finance, March 8, 1995)(Taiwan).

280

In addition, by forbidding private health insurance companies from providing similar
health insurance coverage, the Taiwanese government further strengthens its bargaining power
in the health insurance business, which it basically monopolizes.
281

See National Health Insurance Act ch. VI-VII, art. 56-67 (1994) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=29
5&webdata_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
282

Here, I put the discussions about financial ability and/or tax compensation aside, and
assume that the patient can afford both radiology therapy and palliative care.
283
284

Cheng, supra note 15, at 67.

National Health Insurance Act ch. VIII, art. 70-71 (1994) (Taiwan), available at http://
www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&we
bdata_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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violate the central application range of the freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance.
Furthermore, according to a Taiwanese Finance Ministry regulation, if the
compulsory NHI has provided at least “one” treatment for a disease, private
insurance companies are forbidden to provide “any” medical treatment for this
disease.285 Namely, if health care treatment falls outside the NHI’s universal benefits
package because it is not cost effective, according to the Finance Ministry’s ban, an
individual has neither the opportunity nor the freedom to purchase private insurance
for it, even if he or she has different conceptions of the good about this health care
treatment.286 For example, if the NHI has provided health insurance coverage
including medical treatments Y2 (rather than medical treatment X2) for disease D2,
according to the Financial Ministry’s ban, private insurance companies are forbidden
to provide treatment X2 in their benefits package because the NHI has provided at
least one treatment (treatment Y2) for the disease. Therefore, even if an individual
regards treatment X2 as a good treatment based upon his or her own conception of
the good (which is different from the BNHI’s), and is willing to pay extra for private
insurance package with this treatment, the Financial Ministry’s ban would prevent
the individual from doing so. In other words, even though the NHI Act does not
forbid individuals buying additional private health insurance, the Finance Ministry’s
ban has imposed extreme and substantial limitations on individuals’ choices of
health care. Such a strict ban, which is rare worldwide,287 burdens individuals’ health
care choices in a much broader extent and imposes a significant restriction on the
central application range of individual liberty.
One possible response from the BNHI to my argument is that, since the NHI
provides almost all health care treatments, an individual’s diverse conceptions of the
285
The Taiwanese Ministry of Finance argued that this regulation is necessary for
maintaining the NHI’s competitive advantages. And the Taiwanese Department of Health
recognized maintaining the NHI’s competitive advantages is a justified policy objective,
which I do not agree with. The Ministry of Finance, Tai-Cai-Bao No. 840123987 (1995.3.8.)
(Taiwan).
286
287

Id.

For example, Spece argued that he has not been able to “find reports of any nation that
prohibits both the purchase of “private” or “supplement” insurance and direct purchase of
such care.” Roy G. Spece, A Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied to “Buy Out
Of” Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of Everyone Else to
Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform? 3 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 1, 37 (2007). Furthermore, some governments even expand private health
insurance to substitute for publicly financed coverage (e.g., the statutory health insurance)
where groups of people are allowed to opt out of it and purchase private coverage instead.
SARAH THOMPSON ET AL., FINANCING HEALTH CARE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: CHALLENGES
AND POLICY RESPONSES 57-58 (2009); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, THE REFORM OF HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN
OECD COUNTRIES 122 (1993). For example, the British government has tried to introduce the
concept of the free market to the National Health Service (NHS), and to move away from the
centralized (integrated) model towards a contract model for health care services (i.e., there
was to be a separation of the purchasing and provision of hospitals services, mediated by
contracts ― that is, district health authorities would become purchasers of hospital services
while public hospitals would be freed from the control of district health authorities and would
be allowed to become “self-governing”). Id.
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good regarding health care then can be well protected.288 For example, according to
Article 39 of the NHI Act, all kinds of medical treatments (including traditional
Chinese medicines)289 are covered by the NHI except (1) treatment of drug addiction,
cosmetic surgery, non-post-traumatic orthodontic treatment, preventative surgery,
artificial reproduction, and sex conversion surgery; (2) over-the-counter drugs and
non-prescription drugs which should be used under the guidance of a physician; (3)
human-subject clinical trials; and (4) dentures, artificial eyes, spectacles, hearing
aids, wheelchairs, canes, and other treatment equipment not required for positive
therapy.290 This broad range of the NHI’s medical coverage then allows individuals
with different values and desires to access any medical treatment they prefer in the
NHI program. Therefore, even though the universal compulsory NHI regulates
individuals’ freedom to choose between different health care plans, they still have
multiple choices for pursuing different medical treatments and are capable of fully
exercising their moral powers. In other words, since individuals are still able to
choose between different medical treatments under the NHI’s broad medical
coverage, their capacities to pursue incommensurable conceptions of the good are
preserved.
However, this response focuses only on an individual’s choice of medical
treatments, but still ignores an individual’s autonomy to decide what medical
treatments should be included in the NHI’s medical coverage. In other words, even
though an individual is able to choose whatever medical treatment he or she prefers
in the NHI, the individual still cannot freely purchase a health insurance which
covers only certain medical treatments he or she prefers on the basis of the
288
BUREAU OF NAT’L HEALTH INS., supra note 14, at 25; COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, THE REPORT ON THE PLANNING OF NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE 103 (1990).
289
“Each traditional Chinese medicine clinic (TCM clinic), outpatient department of TCM
hospitals and TCM outpatient department of hospitals may provide the following services: (1)
Diagnosis; (2) Concentrated TCM preparations; (3) Therapeutic materials; (4) Common TCM
treatment, acupuncture therapy as well as fracture and wound treatment.” Regulations for NHI
Medical Care art. 25.1, BUREAU OF NAT’L HEALTH INS., available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/
English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&webdata_id=2430
(last updated Sept. 14, 2011).
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National Health Insurance Act ch. IV, art. 39 (1994) (Taiwan), available at http://www.
nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=295&WD_ID=295&webdata
_id=1865 (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). “Expenses arising from the following service items are
not covered in this Insurance: (1) Medical service items on which the expenses shall be borne
by the government according to other laws or regulations; (2) Immunization and other medical
services on which the expenses shall be borne by the government; (3) Treatment of drug
addiction, cosmetic surgery, non-post-traumatic orthodontic treatment, preventative surgery,
artificial reproduction, and sex conversion surgery; (4) Over-the-counter drugs and nonprescription drugs which should be used under the guidance of a physician; (5) Services
provided by specially designated doctors, specially registered nurses and senior registered
nurses; (6) Blood, except for blood transfusion necessary for emergent injury or illness
according to the diagnosis by the doctor ; (7) Human-subject clinical trials; (8) Hospital day
care, except for psychiatric care; (9) Food other than those which are to be tube feeding and
balance billing for wards; (10) Transportation, registration fee, and certificate for the patient;
(11) Dentures, artificial eyes, spectacles, hearing aids, wheelchairs, canes, and other treatment
equipment not required for positive therapy; (12) Other treatments and drugs promulgated by
the Competent Authority not to be covered.” Id.
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conceptions of the good. The medical coverage (or health care benefit package) is
important because it also exemplifies an individual’s diverse conception of the good
regarding health care and shows the significance of voluntary health care decisions
in health care rationing. For example, there are two medical treatments X3 and Y3 for
disease D3, and an individual prefers health insurance that covers only medical
treatment X3. However, under the compulsory NHI’s single-payer system, he or she
would be forced to purchase an all-inclusive medical coverage (including both
medical treatments X3 and Y3), which is arbitrarily determined by the BNHI. The
individual has no authority to exclude treatment Y3 from that coverage. Therefore,
even though the NHI’s broad medical coverage allows the individual the option to
choose medical treatment X3 and to develop her own intrinsic value regarding
medical treatments, her capacity for the conceptions of the good are still limited
because she cannot pursue her rational choice of medical coverage, which also
relates to intimate and important decisions about her health. Thus, requiring an
individual to accept NHI’s comprehensive, all-inclusive medical coverage of almost
all medical treatments would deprive her capacities for the conceptions of the good.
The central application range of the individual’s freedom to purchase or decline
health insurance then is unjustifiably restricted.
In conclusion, under the NHI’s individual mandate clause, accompanied by the
single-payer system’s universal insurance package and the Finance Ministry’s ban
against “supplemental” private health insurance, individuals with incommensurable
conceptions of the good are neither allowed to opt out the compulsory NHI nor
allowed the chance to buy their preferred health care outside the NHI. They have no
choice but to accept the NHI’s universal benefits package, while their capacities to
pursue their own conceptions of the good regarding health care through the purchase
of private health insurance are significantly restricted.
2. Trade-off under the Compulsory NHI
Since the compulsory NHI with the single-payer system leaves individuals no
option of other benefits policies and significantly restricts the central application
range of the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance,291 thus, the trade-off
under the NHI’s individual mandate should be assessed on the basis of the priority
rule. In other words, the universal compulsory NHI’s restriction on individual liberty
is unjustified unless the Taiwanese government can prove that the policy is
necessary to protect other liberties or to strengthen the total system of liberty, rather
than to protect economic interests or social benefits.
Unfortunately, according to the discussions in Section VI, the policy purposes of
the NHI are confined to maximizing the participation rate, increasing the financial
revenues, preventing adverse selection, and protecting the disadvantaged citizen’s
right to health care. There is no motive to strengthen the total system of liberty
shared by all. In other words, abandoning or adjusting the NHI’s individual mandate
would only cause potential economic losses, without disrupting other liberties of all
citizens or the state’s capacity to provide liberties for all. According to the priority
rule, the burdens on the exercise of moral powers imposed by the compulsory NHI,
which are directly related to individuals’ capabilities to engage in mutually
beneficial cooperation and honor fair terms, are much greater than pursued public
orders, which are confined to economic interests only. Therefore, there is no proper
291
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trade-off between the restricted freedom to purchase or decline health insurance and
the proposed public order. The human rights burden of the compulsory NHI with a
single-payer system cannot be justified because it fails the priority rule.
D. Importance Test for Individual Mandate with Insurance Package Options
The second case is a compulsory health insurance scheme with a number of
options in terms of insurance packages (President Obama’s health care reform in the
United States of America).292 In that system, the central application range of the
freedom to purchase or decline health insurance is deemed to be regulated rather
than restricted. This freedom is deemed regulated even though all citizens are
required to enroll in health insurance because the system still grants the freedom to
negotiate with health insurers and to choose between different medical coverage.293
In other words, under a compulsory health insurance with additional options in terms
of insurance packages, a rational individual still has room to choose particular
medical interventions. This type of compulsory health insurance possesses the
properties or promises to deliver the results an individual would likely want because
they can choose different health insurance packages. Individuals with different ideas
about what kinds of integrated bodily functions they prefer are still able to pursue
their own and incommensurable conceptions of the good in health care. The
individual’s moral powers—especially the capacity for the conceptions of the
good—are reserved in this case.
According to the importance test, a compulsory health insurance system with
additional insurance package options does not restrict the central application range of
the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance.294 Therefore, the evaluation of
the trade-off between the restricted liberty and the pursued public order should be
subject to the public interest rule. In other words, if the state proves that the
compulsory health insurance scheme can achieve greater social benefits (e.g.,
preventing adverse selection and improving health care disparities, see Section VI),
it is justified for the state to apply the compulsory health insurance scheme to
“regulate” the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance.
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On the one hand, to avoid resistance from the currently insured, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act does not seek to supplant or supersede the private or public programs
already in place. Tumulty et al., supra note 3. On the other hand, the Act also requires the
government to develop uniform coverage documents so consumers (small businesses and
individuals) can make apples-apples comparisons when shopping for health insurance and
choosing form a selection of insurance policies. In other words, the new Act leaves a lot of
room for variations. Tumulty et al., supra note 3. For example, according to Glenn Cohen, the
U.S. health care reform’s individual mandate somewhat restricts individual liberty, but it
“continues to leave open as discretion as to plan choice (constrained by the mandates
minimum benefit requirements).” Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients With Passports: Medical
Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1550 (2010). Troy J.
Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes also argued that, the individual mandate merely requires
individuals to maintain minimum essential coverage. Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note
57 at 280-81. As long as the minimum benefits requirements are met, consumers can compare
competing health plan benefits and purchase their preferred plan. Id.
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See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
Section 5000A(a).
294

See supra Part VIII(A).
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Through epidemic statistics, there is also a greater social benefit for the
compulsory health insurance with insurance package options to pursue in exchange
for the limited individual liberty.295 For example, studies have shown that the NHI’s
individual mandate alone (regardless of the single payer system) can help to improve
access to health care for vulnerable populations.296 In Taiwan, prior to the
implementation of the NHI program in 1995, approximately 7.5 million individuals
(40.1% of Taiwan’s population, see infra, Figure 4) did not have any health
insurance coverage.297 The uninsured were the most vulnerable population in society:
65.94% of the uninsured were children and adolescents, making up approximately
75% of the population of children and adolescents; and 8.00% of the uninsured were
the elderly, making up approximately 26% of the elderly population.298 The
uninsured vulnerable populations were significantly more likely to report a poor
level of health and had significantly lower utilization rates for health care services,
compared to those individuals who had similar health care needs.299 Since the NHI
was implemented, more than 96% of Taiwan’s population has been registered in this
program – an economic scale large enough to prevent reverse selection.300
Individuals were more likely to report seeking health care when ill.301 The newly
insured consumed more than twice the amount of outpatient physician visits (0.21
vs. 0.48 physician visits in two weeks) and hospital admissions (0.04 vs. 0.11
hospital admissions in two weeks) than before the NHI was implemented. This
brought the newly insured to the same amount of health care contacts as the
previously insured groups in Labor Insurance, Government Employee Insurance, and
Farmers Insurance.302 In addition, studies also showed that the compulsory NHI
maintained relatively low administrative costs.303 Since program implementation, the
ratio of administrative costs to total health care expenditures has remained below the
legally mandated cap of 3.5%.304
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Figure 4. Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Uninsured before NHI (1995)
Military Health Program: 2.3%
15-19 yrs old:
13.45%
Labor Insurance, Government
Employee Insurance, and
Farmers Insurance: 57.6%

Uninsured: 40.1%

under 14 yrs old:
52.49%

20-59 yrs old:
26.06%

Over 65 yrs old:
8.00%
(% of total population)

IX. CONCLUSION
This Article establishes a four-step human rights assessment to carefully explore
how the compulsory NHI’s restrictions on the freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance should be evaluated. After analysis, despite Taiwan’s universal
compulsory NHI being adequate and effective (Step 2), such a coercive health care
policy still unjustifiably restricts individuals’ freedom to purchase or decline health
insurance because it is not the least intrusive alternative (Step 3) and provides no
proper trade-off between restricted liberty and pursued public order (Step 4).305
Even though the NHI’s individual mandate might unconstitutionally and
unjustifiably restrict individual liberty, neither the primary NHI nor the secondgeneration NHI (the health care reform enacted in 2011) address this problem
squarely. Without adjusting the individual mandate clause, the new NHI Act of 2011
puts emphasis only on improving social benefits (such as the improvement of health
care quality, and providing for mandatory disclosure for health care providers’
information) and reducing economic inefficiency – such as the balance between
insurance revenues and medical disbursements, and the improvement of the
efficiency of the administration system.306 The compulsory scheme, along with the
single-payer system, has remained without careful and explicit assessment of the
burdens this coercive health care policy imposes on human rights. Society’s
continued disregard of the compulsory NHI’s restrictions on individual liberty not
only fail to consider possible variations but also cause society to remain ignorant of
the alternative policy which is least intrusive while achieving parallel policy
305
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See supra Part IV.
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objectives.307 Furthermore, it would undervalue the significance of individual liberty
in health care programs and disrespect individuals’ incommensurable conceptions of
the good regarding health care.308 Therefore, we must recognize that we are at a
cross-roads: even though there seems to be a moral consensus that we should turn
toward compulsory health insurance for greater social benefits, we have yet to
discover a constitutionally clear path of doing so through careful consideration.309
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